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Neo-Segregation in Minnesota
Myron Orfield† and Will Stancil
Introduction
If there were a single central contribution that Minnesota has
made to American history, it would be its leadership in civil rights,
particularly its efforts to advance racial integration in schools and
housing. In no other field has the state had such a profound, positive
impact on American law, culture, and politics. Minnesota leaders—
Black and White, Republican and Democrat—were central to the
development of the modern conception of racial civil rights and of
an integrated, universal society. They pioneered far-sighted state
laws and policies to achieve equality in schools and housing,
inventing new ways of thinking about and using government and
policy. Without those leaders and their intellectual and political
labors, it is difficult to imagine that the core American civil rights
laws—the 1964 Civil Rights Act, the 1965 Voting Rights Act, and
the Fair Housing Act of 1968—would have been passed in their
modern form.
Even more impressive progress occurred at the state and local
level, where Minnesota law overcame many of the barriers, legal
and political, that had limited the reach of federal statutory rights.
Minneapolis would be one of the first cities in the country to pass
an enforceable Fair Employment Practices Commission and outlaw
racial covenants.1 In 1955, the state enacted a Fair Employment
Practices law; in 1961, a state Fair Housing Act; and in 1967, a
comprehensive civil rights law that folded previous legal protections
into a powerful state Human Rights Act providing disparate impact
causes of action for all forms of discrimination and administrative
authority to outlaw de facto segregation.2
But if the North Star State had helped lead the United States
towards a more just and integrated society, in recent years an
equally varied collection of Minnesotans is helping undermine those

†. Earl R. Larson Professor of Civil Rights and Civil Liberties Law, University
of Minnesota
1. CARL SOLBERG, HUBERT HUMPHREY 106 (1984).
2. Id.; ELMER L. ANDERSEN, A MAN’S REACH 210 (Lori Sturdevant ed., 2000);
Your Civil Rights, MINN. DEP’T OF HUM. RTS., https://mn.gov/mdhr/yourrights/
[https://perma.cc/X7MG-438X].
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historic accomplishments. Where a cross-partisan consensus once
existed in favor of traditional civil rights, today a coterie of
Minnesotan leaders are working together to promote ideas that
attempt to circumnavigate the thorny issue of equal rights and
integration. The leaders include members of both major parties,
elected officials, businesspeople, community figureheads, and
industry representatives. In a number of notable instances, these
leaders have directly defended racial segregation, or even praised
its benefits. The reforms being promoted by this group may seem
new—even innovative—at first glance. But those reforms defend
and perpetuate the very old, and deeply entrenched, system of racial
segregation. These are Minnesota’s neo-segregationists.
Neo-segregationists use the purported defeat of Jim Crow to
advance a set of solutions which leave racial enclaves untouched.
They assert that—now that Black and Latino families have the
legal right to live in any neighborhood they wish, and formal school
segregation is nominally prohibited—any continuing racial
patterns reflect a choice by those same families to live separately.
Many maintain that not only is this choice clearly expressed, but it
is in fact preferable and ultimately beneficial to the solidarity and
economic prosperity of the groups in question. Despite
overwhelming evidence of Black and Latino preference for
integrated neighborhoods and decades of academic study showing
the myriad ways that illegal discrimination produces segregation,
neo-segregationists accept the status quo as proof that the status
quo is desirable and inevitable.
This article traces Minnesota’s civil rights heritage, including
its historical contributions to the nation’s movements for racial
justice, its local innovations to promote integration and civil rights,
and the emergence of the neo-segregationist opposition.
Part I briefly revisits the state’s civil rights history, with an
eye towards Minnesota’s important role on the national stage. Part
II discusses the pursuit of school integration in the state since
Brown v. Board of Education, focusing on the recent resegregation
of its schools. Part III discusses Minnesota’s development, and then
abandonment, of pioneering housing and urban development
policies, which briefly served as a national model for housing
integration.
Minnesota has in the past led the nation into progress on civil
rights, creating some of the United States’ most integrated schools
and neighborhoods. People who would laud these victories can only
fear the growing effectiveness of Minnesota’s neo-segregationists,
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and hope that, in this respect, the state does not once again act as
a bellwether for the nation.
I.

Minnesota’s Civil Rights Heritage

Minnesota’s role in the history of civil rights has been unique.
Despite spending much of its history as one of the Whitest states,3
Minnesota has led the nation in passing and supporting
foundational civil rights legislation, particularly systemic reforms
to housing and schools. The state has also produced a hugely
disproportionate share of leaders for racial justice, both Black and
White.4 Some may argue that Minnesota’s very Whiteness and
homogeneity gave its political leaders freedom to act on these
questions. Yet other equally-White states did not generate
equivalent contributions. Instead, Minnesotan civil rights
leadership is rooted, in large part, in a continuous intellectual and
political heritage that can be traced to the Civil War and the state’s
founding years.
A. Early Years
Some of Minnesota’s early territorial political leaders were
abolitionists from Massachusetts, Maine, and New York.5 After the
passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act (which overruled the Missouri
Compromise and allowed the population of each state to decide its
own status on slavery), Minnesota entered into the union as a free
state in 1858, with both its Democrats and Republicans strongly
opposing slavery.6 Militant abolitionists protested the arrival of
slaveholders on the St. Paul levy, at the hotels of slaveholders on
vacation during Minnesota’s temperate summers, and “kidnapped”
slaves passing through the state in order to shepherd them to
freedom.7 Minnesota’s courts flouted the Supreme Court’s Dred

3. Whitest
States
2021,
WORLD
POP.
REV.
(2021),
https://worldpopulationreview.com/state-rankings/whitest-states [https://perma.cc/
H27Z-UGUK].
4. See JENNIFER A. DELTON, MAKING MINNESOTA LIBERAL: CIVIL RIGHTS AND
THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE DEMOCRATIC PARTY XVI, at 76–77 (2002).
5. See WILLIAM D. GREEN, A PECULIAR IMBALANCE: THE FALL AND RISE OF
RACIAL EQUALITY IN EARLY MINNESOTA 71–82 (2007) [hereinafter GREEN, A
PECULIAR IMBALANCE] (noting that these leaders settled and were most prominent
in St. Anthony Falls).
6. See id. at 73, 82–89 (explaining that while both parties agreed on their
opposition to slavery, they differed over the issue of Black suffrage).
7. WILLIAM D. GREEN, DEGREES OF FREEDOM: THE ORIGINS OF CIVIL RIGHTS IN
MINNESOTA, 1865–1912, at 23–25 (2015) [hereinafter GREEN, DEGREES OF
FREEDOM].
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Scott decision by freeing slaves brought into the state by
slaveholders under the Minnesota Constitution.8
Minnesota was the first state to offer troops in the Civil War.9
The First Minnesota Volunteers suffered one of the highest
casualties of any Northern regiment as they fought at Gettysburg,
the turning point of the American Civil War.10 On the last day of
Gettysburg, the First Minnesota seized the Virginia militia’s battle
flag.11 For 150 years, Virginia has demanded its return, President
Grover Cleveland ordered its return through an executive order,
and Virginians initiated a federal lawsuit claiming Minnesota is in
illegal possession of the flag.12 Minnesota has refused, with former
Governor Mark Dayton declaring the captured flag “something that
was earned through the incredible courage and valor [sic] men who
gave their lives and risked their lives to obtain it,” and that “it
would be a sacrilege to return it” to a state planning to
commemorate the Confederacy.13
Minnesota Congressman Ignatius Donnelly fought to forbid
educational segregation in public schools established or aided by
federal funds.14 Minnesota legalized Black suffrage through public
referendum two years before congressional ratification of the
Fifteenth Amendment.15 In 1869, Minnesota outlawed racial
segregation in its schools and enacted legislation to withhold all
state funding to any segregated public school (nearly 100 years

8. The most famous case being that of Eliza Winston, a slave accompanying her
mistress on vacation to Minnesota in 1860. Abolitionists brought a writ of habeas
corpus, and Winston was freed from her master, who was staying at a lodge on Lake
Harriet in Minneapolis. A Hennepin County Judge held that the Minnesota
Constitution forbade slavery despite the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling that no state
could do so. William D. Green, Eliza Winston and the Politics of Freedom, 57 MINN.
HIST. 106, 107–08 (2000).
9. The Civil War (1861-1865), MINN. HIST. SOC’Y, https://www.mnhs.org/
fortsnelling/learn/military-history/civil-war [https://perma.cc/G5U8-2BU7].
10. Maja Beckstrom, Minnesota Civil War Regiment Charged Into History at
Gettysburg, PIONEER PRESS (Feb. 4, 2017), https://www.twincities.com/2013/06/28/
minnesota-civil-war-regiment-charged-into-history-at-gettysburg/
[https://perma.cc/U8QF-4VHJ].
11. Brian Resnick, 150 Years After Gettysburg, Virginia and Minnesota Fight
Over Confederate Flag, ATLANTIC (June 28, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/
national/archive/2013/06/150-years-after-gettysburg-virginia-and-minnesota-fightover-confederate-flag/313796/ [https://perma.cc/7R79-DJLC].
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. GREEN, A PECULIAR IMBALANCE, supra note 5, at 168.
15. Id. at 148.
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before Congress would do the same with passage of Title VI of the
1964 Civil Rights Act).16
In 1883, the U.S. Supreme Court in the Civil Rights Cases
declared that prohibiting discrimination in public accommodations
was beyond the reach of Congress under the Fourteenth
Amendment.17 Two years later, the Minnesota legislature outlawed
segregation in public accommodations under state law.18 In 1921,
after a racially motivated lynching in Duluth, Minnesota made
lynching a crime decades before Congress would act.19
The national movement toward racial integration in schools
and neighborhoods began in St. Paul in 1905 when Frank McGhee,
a brilliant Black Minnesota attorney, agreed, in two historic
strategy meetings with W.E.B. Du Bois, to form the Niagara
movement.20 The movement broke with the separatist policies of
Booker T. Washington and would lead to the formation of the
NAACP and its central strategy to end apartheid in schools and
neighborhoods.21 McGhee would represent this movement by
bringing legal actions against Jim Crow in Tennessee and other
states.22 McGhee was the first in a series of great Black civil rights
lawyers fighting for racial integration, a pantheon that would
ultimately grow to include Charles Hamilton Houston and
Thurgood Marshall.
McGhee was a trailblazer: out of Minnesota, a new generation
of remarkable Black civil rights leaders would launch their careers,
and an unusual number became icons of the national movement.
Roy Wilkins, Clarence Mitchell Jr., Anna Arnold Hedgemen, and
Whitney Young, who either grew up or started their careers in
Minnesota, secured some of the early victories of the modern civil
rights movement against racial covenants and employment
discrimination in Minneapolis and St. Paul.23 Based on these local
achievements, they moved to the national stage to become some of

16. Id. at 169–70.
17. GREEN, DEGREES OF FREEDOM, supra note 7, at 124–25.
18. Id. at 130–32.
19. Marilyn Ziebarth, Judge Lynch in Minnesota, MINN. HIST. SOC’Y, Summer
1996, at 72, 72–73 [https://perma.cc/B85Z-8KTN]; see generally William D. Green, To
Remove the Stain: The Trial of the Duluth Lynchers, MINN. HIST. SOC’Y, Spring 2004,
at 22 (recounting the events of the lynching and public response afterwards).
20. GREEN, DEGREES OF FREEDOM, supra note 7, at 289–91.
21. Id. at 293–94.
22. Id. at 298; see also ANGELA JONES, AFRICAN AMERICAN CIVIL RIGHTS: EARLY
ACTIVISM AND THE NIAGARA MOVEMENT 224 (2011).
23. See DELTON, supra note 4, at 76, 83.
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the most important national Black civil rights leaders.24 Wilkins
would become the national executive director of the NAACP during
its years of greatest accomplishment, Young the executive director
of the National Urban League, and Hedgemen leader of the
movement toward the adoption of the Fair Employment Practices
Committee.25
These iconic figures, together with Lena Smith, Minnesota’s
first Black female lawyer and chair of the Minneapolis NAACP,26
Nellie Stone Johnson,27 W. Harry Davis,28 and Mathew Little,29
would place racial integration of schools and neighborhoods at the
heart of the civil rights movement in Minnesota, later at the center
of the national struggle for freedom.
Minnesota experienced early successes that other places did
not. As racial covenants and violence stopped residential
integration in it tracks in Chicago, Detroit, and almost every
northern city,30 Smith and the Minneapolis NAACP defeated these
tactics in a historical struggle in a south Minneapolis neighborhood.
In June of 1931, Arthur and Edith Lee, a Black couple,
purchased a home at 4600 Columbus Avenue, in a White
neighborhood bordering the “color line.”31 After initial threats
against the Lees failed, abusive crowds of thousands gathered

24. Id.
25. Roy Wilkins, NAACP, https://naacp.org/find-resources/history-explained/
civil-rights-leaders/roy-wilkins [https://perma.cc/JD5N-SSFL]; Whitney M. Young,
Jr., ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/biography/Whitney-MYoung-Jr [https://perma.cc/5K4B-SR2V]; Emma Rothberg, Anna Arnold Hedgeman,
NAT’L WOMEN’S HIST. MUSEUM, https://www.womenshistory.org/educationresources/biographies/anna-arnold-hedgeman [https://perma.cc/EKX8-HQ64].
26. Jackie Sluss, Lena Olive Smith: Civil Rights in the 1930s, HENNEPIN HIST.
MAG., Winter 1995, https://hennepinhistory.org/lena-olive-smith/ [https://perma.cc/
5H66-SY3M].
27. DELTON, supra note 4, at 88–89.
28. W. Harry Davis, STAR TRIB. (Aug. 16, 2006), https://www.startribune.com/
obituaries/detail/8414425/ [https://perma.cc/CNR2-DE3T].
29. Matthew Little: Fighting the Fires of Injustice, MINN. HIST. SOC’Y,
https://www.mnhs.org/mgg/boom/building-life/6509 [https://perma.cc/6BS3-SPDH].
30. See generally JOE T. DARDEN & RICHARD W. THOMAS, DETROIT: RACE RIOTS,
RACIAL CONFLICTS, AND EFFORTS TO BRIDGE THE RACIAL DIVIDE (2013) (providing
historical analysis of racial conflict in Detroit and the violence that sprung from it);
Whet Moser, How White Housing Riots Shaped Chicago, CHI. MAG. (Apr. 29, 2015),
https://www.chicagomag.com/city-life/april-2015/how-white-housing-riots-shapedchicago/ [https://perma.cc/JTE4-UB2S] (recounting decades of racial riots in Chicago
and the similarities to how racial segregation developed and was sustained in
Baltimore).
31. Ben Welter, July 16, 1931: Angry White Mob Surrounds Minneapolis Home,
STAR TRIB. (May 29, 2020), https://www.startribune.com/july-16-1931-angry-whitemob-surrounds-minneapolis-home/283979011/ [https://perma.cc/4JCZ-KSTY].
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nightly around their house, throwing stones and firecrackers, and
becoming increasingly violent.32 Rather than back down as others
were forced to do all over the country, Lena Smith galvanized the
local NAACP, churches, and reform organizations to defend the
Lees.33 Notably, she also personally appealed to progressive
Governor Floyd B. Olson, who mobilized the Minnesota National
Guard to disperse the crowds.34 This was unprecedented in
residentially segregated northern cities. Out of this victory would
come the Tilsenbilt homes, likely the first intentionally racially
integrated neighborhood in the United States.35
B. Emergence of the Civil Rights Movement
Perhaps because of successes like these, many of Minnesota’s
political leaders remained strong civil rights advocates throughout
the 20th century. This included Republican Party leaders, such as
Governors Harold Stassen, Luther Youngdahl, Elmer L. Anderson,
Harold LeVander, Al Quie, and Arne Carlson, who remained
supportive of civil rights initiatives through the 1990s, even while
many of their co-partisans had backed away from racial justice
issues.36 Governor Quie, when he served in Congress, even worked
hand in hand with Hubert Humphrey to pass the 1964 Civil Rights
Act.37
But on the other side of the aisle, the issue had taken on an
even greater importance. In 1944, the Minnesota Farmer-Labor
Party, a left-leaning, anti-Wall Street, isolationist entity, merged
with the more centrist Minnesota Democratic Party.38 The Farmer
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Lena at 100: Celebrating a Civil Rights Icon, MITCHELL HAMLINE (June 14,
2021), https://mitchellhamline.edu/news/2021/06/14/lena-at-100-celebrating-a-civilrights-icon/ [https://perma.cc/3A8R-B3SY].
35. Deebaa Sirdar & Richard L. Kronick, Tilsenbilt Homes Historic District,
MINN. HIST. SOC’Y, https://minneapolishistorical.org/items/show/174 [https://perma.
cc/U6JD-QD2R].
36. Iric Nathanson, From Mainstream to Extinct: A Look Back at the GOP’s
Progressive Era in Minnesota, MINNPOST (Oct. 18, 2018), https://www.minnpost.com/
politics-policy/2018/10/from-mainstream-to-extinct-a-look-back-at-the-gopsprogressive-era-in-minnesota/ [https://perma.cc/8PBD-WKNM].
37. See Doug Grow, Remembering the Voting Rights Act – And an Era When
Bipartisanship
Wasn’t
Uncommon,
MINNPOST
(July
31,
2015),
https://www.minnpost.com/politics-policy/2015/07/remembering-voting-rights-actand-era-when-bipartisanship-wasnt-uncommon/ [https://perma.cc/8SRE-WNVH].
38. See DELTON, supra note 4, at 1–18 (providing background on the rise of the
Farmer-Labor party and its merger with the Democrats); see generally JOHN EARL
HAYNES, DUBIOUS ALLIANCE: THE MAKING OF MINNESOTA’S DFL PARTY (1984)
(accounting for the historically fraught struggle between the Democratic and Farmer
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Laborites disliked and feared the pro-business, internationalist
bent of the Democrats. They agreed to merge only after receiving a
clear commitment that the new, joint party would become the
national leader in the one area where both factions saw eye-to-eye:
civil rights issues.39 Thus, the question of racial equality and
integration became the mortar which fused Minnesota’s DFL party
together.
Hubert Humphrey would emerge as the leader of this new
party.40 True to the terms of the merger, Humphrey would, as
mayor of Minneapolis, act immediately to fulfill the party’s civil
rights agenda. In 1947, civil rights leaders would work with Hubert
Humphrey to abolish racial covenants in Minneapolis.41 Humphrey
and the Minneapolis City Council would establish one of the
nation’s first fair employment ordinances that same year.42
These local accomplishments immediately made Humphrey a
national civil rights figure, not to mention a hero of the Americans
for Democratic Action, an organization that would become the era’s
leading liberal voice for integration.43 Humphrey built his national
reputation as a liberal Democrat interested in human relations and
was called on to speak to emerging civil rights organizations
throughout the north.44 “I have an unholy desire to communicate to
eastern audiences,” he told a columnist.45
With Wilkins, Young, and Mitchell at his side—now national
leaders in their own right—not to mention Lena Smith and Nellie
Stone Johnson, young Hubert Humphrey would take on the
President of the United States and the unified leadership of the
Democratic Party to force the inclusion of a pro-integration civil
rights plank in the national party platform.46
The struggle is nowhere better described than in Robert Caro’s
book The Master of the Senate. At first, Humphrey was stymied in

Labor parties, their contentious merger into the Democratic Farmer Labor party,
and how this influenced the generation of liberal Minnesotan politicians such as
Hubert Humphrey and Walter Mondale that would follow).
39. DELTON, supra note 4, at 158–59.
40. See SOLBERG, supra note 1, at 122–23.
41. DELTON, supra note 4, at 104–10.
42. SOLBERG, supra note 1, at 106.
43. ROBERT CARO, MASTER OF THE SENATE: THE YEARS OF LYNDON JOHNSON III,
at 437 (2003).
44. DELTON, supra note 4, at 119.
45. Id.
46. CARO, supra note 43, at 438.
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the party’s platform committee.47 Caro describes Humphrey’s
triumphant effort to drive a sea change in the party:
Humphrey was told to his face that speaking for the minority
plank would ruin—permanently—his own career . . . . But,
Humphrey was also to say, some issues were beyond
compromise. “For me personally and for the party, the time had
come to suffer whatever the consequences.”
...
For once his speech was short—only eight minutes long, in fact,
only thirty-seven sentences.
And by the time Hubert Humphrey was halfway through those
sentences, his head tilted back, his jaw thrust out, his upraised
right hand clenched into a fist, the audience was cheering every
one—even before he reached the climax, and said, his voice
ringing across the hall, “To those who say we are rushing this
issue of civil rights—I say to them, we are one hundred and
seventy-two years late.”
“To those who say this bill is an infringement on states’ rights,
I say this—the time has arrived in America. The time has
arrived for the Democratic Party to get out of the shadow of
states’ rights and walk forthrightly into the bright sunshine of
human rights.”
“People,” Hubert Humphrey cried, in a phrase that seemed to
burst out of him; it was not in the written text. “People! Human
beings!—this is the issue of the twentieth century.” “In these
times of world economic, political and spiritual—above all,
spiritual—crisis, we cannot and we must not turn back from the
path so plainly before us. That path has already led us through
many valleys of the shadows of death. Now is the time to recall
those who were left on the path of American freedom. Our land
is now, more than ever before, the last best hope on earth. I
know that we can—know that we shall—begin here the fuller
and richer realization of that hope—that promise—of a land
where all men are truly free and equal.”
...
While Humphrey had been speaking, there had been something
else that Paul Douglas would never forget: “hard-boiled
politicians dabbing their eyes with their handkerchiefs.”48

The minority plank would win, 651.5 to 582.5.49 The Dixiecrats
would walk out.50 Strom Thurmond, as their nominee, would win
four states, but Truman would more than make up for this in an
increased Black vote in northern states that would carry him to
victory.51
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Id. at 438–42.
Id. at 443–44.
Id. at 444.
Id.
Id.
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After his election to the Senate, Humphrey would come to
Washington as a liberal hero, but was initially marginalized by the
Senate’s political leadership.52 However, events eventually
quickened the pace of progress.
Congressional liberals were empowered by developments like
the 1954 Brown decision, and the emergence of Martin Luther King,
Jr. and his work on the Montgomery bus boycott.53 Episodes like the
Little Rock Crisis and the growth of massive resistance began to
impress upon Lyndon Johnson, at the time Senate Majority Leader,
the importance of making headway on civil rights if he wanted to
ever lay claim on the Democratic presidential nomination.54
In this, Humphrey had a role to play. He began to serve as
Majority Leader Johnson’s conduit to the liberal faction of the
legislature, and in that capacity helped Johnson break the Senate
gridlock that had prevented the passage of civil right legislation for
the past 80 years.55 The 1957 and 1960 Civil Rights Acts were not
substantive, but they represented a breaking of a dam, and
suggested that future progress was on its way.56
In 1963, civil rights leaders organized the March on
Washington, arguably the most important single civil rights
demonstration in modern history.57 Of the “Big Six” who organized
the March, three would be Minnesotans. In addition to Dr. King,
John Lewis, and James Farmer, the six included Roy Wilkins,
Whitney Young, and Anna Arnold Hedgemen, representing the
NAACP, National Urban League, and National Council of
Churches, respectively (the latter taking the place of A. Phillip
Randolph, the aging head of the Brotherhood of Sleeping Car
Porters).58

52. See SOLBERG, supra note 1, at 133–39 (noting that Humphrey, initially hailed
by Time as the “[n]o. 1 prospect for liberalism in this country,” received low level
committee appointments, was referred to as a fool by Senate leader Dick Russell,
had his favored legislation blocked, and was publicly embarrassed by the questioning
of Senator Robert Taft).
53. CARO, supra note 43, at 709–10.
54. Id. at 132–63.
55. SOLBERG, supra note 1, at 179–80.
56. Id. at 79; CARO, supra note 43, at 1032–33.
57. See generally WILLIAM P. JONES, THE MARCH ON WASHINGTON: JOBS,
FREEDOM, AND THE FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF CIVIL RIGHTS (2013) (providing a
comprehensive history of the March on Washington and its impact).
58. Tina Burnside, Minnesota Advocate Anna Arnold Hedgeman Worked at the
Intersection of Black and Women’s Rights, MINNPOST (Mar. 8, 2021),
https://www.minnpost.com/mnopedia/2021/03/minnesota-advocate-anna-arnoldhedgeman-worked-at-the-intersection-of-black-and-womens-rights/
[https://perma.cc/JW4Y-KEEP].
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Humphrey’s larger role would come after the March, as the
floor leader for the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, whose
major planks involved employment and public accommodation.59
Title VI allowed the Justice Department to commence school
desegregation suits and the cutoff of federal funds to segregated
schools and public housing.60 The bill would take the whole summer
of 1964, and Humphrey’s legislative genius, especially bringing
Illinois Republican Everett Dirksen into the fold, would be central
to its passage.61
The leaders of the 1960s saw segregation as a central
mechanism by which Black Americans were oppressed and
understood the elimination of segregation to be a core aim, if not the
core aim, of the entire movement. In his famous speech during the
March on Washington, and over 100 other speeches and writings,
King condemned segregation:
But 100 years later, the Negro is still not free. One hundred
years later, the life of the Negro is still sadly crippled by the
manacles of segregation and the chains of discrimination. One
hundred years later, the Negro lives on a lonely island of
poverty in the midst of a vast ocean of material prosperity. One
hundred years later, the Negro is still languished in the corners
of American society and finds himself in exile in his own land.62

King was an unambiguous foe of segregation in schools and
neighborhoods. He would write:
[I]f democracy is to live, segregation must die. Segregation is a
glaring evil. It is utterly unchristian. It relegates the segregated
to the status of a thing rather than elevate him to the status of
the person. Segregation is nothing but slavery covered up with
certain niceties of complexity. Segregation is a blatant denial of
the unity which we all have in Christ Jesus.63

Although the legal distinction between “de facto” and “de jure”
segregation was not widespread at the time, writings from the
period make it clear that leaders’ concerns about segregation were
not restricted to the mere existence of discriminatory laws, but the
actual fact of racial separation. Humphrey himself would make this
clear in his 1964 book Integration vs Segregation:
59. SOLBERG, supra note 1, at 221–27.
60. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST.,
https://www.justice.gov/crt/fcs/TitleVI [https://perma.cc/6CHM-KC47].
61. See SOLBERG, supra note 1, at 223–27 (highlighting that Humphrey publicly
praised and cultivated the support of Senator Dirksen from the start, constantly
asking for his input and choosing to have negotiations take place in Dirksen’s office).
62. Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have a Dream, Address at the March on
Washington (Aug. 28, 1963).
63. Martin Luther King, Jr., Facing the Challenge of a New Age, Address at the
First Annual Institute on Nonviolence and Social Change (Dec. 3, 1956).
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A first essential is to comprehend the magnitude of the problem
[of segregation] as it exists now, after generations of segregated
education. In any part of the nation today, a Negro baby has
only half the chance of completing high school, and one-third
the chance of completing college, as a white baby born at the
same time and place. And today, almost a decade after the
Supreme Court ruling against segregated education, only about
9 per cent of the more than three million Negro children of
school age in the southern and border states attend integrated
schools.64

And:
[O]ur society cannot refuse the Negro an equal education and
then refuse to employ him in a decent job on the grounds that
he is untrained. We cannot follow a deliberate policy of
apartheid and then say we refuse to have our children associate
with the Negro because of differences in behavior. Such
differences as exist result from this very pattern of forcing the
Negro’s exclusion from the mainstream of American life.
. . . But if responsible leaders fail to act affirmatively and
constructively, they lose the battle. If they wait for “public
opinion to jell,” the leadership role inevitably will be seized by
racial extremists. Public opinion must be considered in shaping
policy, but policy in itself is a powerful determinant of that
opinion. For the successful desegregation and integration of our
schools and communities, resolute leadership is essential.65

C. The Fair Housing Act
No single piece of civil rights legislation has stronger
Minnesota ties than the Civil Rights Act of 1968, also known as the
Fair Housing Act.
Throughout the 1960s, civil rights campaigners had pushed for
government action to eliminate segregation in housing.66 These fair
housing advocates had seen little success at the federal level but
had won some limited victories in state and local contexts.67 This
was especially true in Minnesota, where both the city of
Minneapolis and the state itself were early adopters of fair housing
legislation.68

64. INTEGRATION VS SEGREGATION 2 (Hubert H. Humphrey ed., 1964).
65. Id. at 6–7.
66. See generally JULIET Z. SALTMAN, OPEN HOUSING AS A SOCIAL MOVEMENT
(1971) (studying the housing movement at the national and local levels during the
1950s and 1960s).
67. Id. at 127–28 (noting that New York, Denver, Los Angeles, and Seattle all
had fair housing programs that ranged from limited to tremendous success).
68. SOLBERG, supra note 1, at 117–18; ANDERSEN, supra note 2, at 210.
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In 1966, Dr. King campaigned for the Fair Housing Act in
Chicago.69 Dr. King’s efforts in the suburbs of Chicago were met
with violence.70 Riots broke out in Watts and Cleveland shortly
thereafter.71 Nearly 160 riots occurred across the country in July
and August of 1967.72
As a result, progress on fair housing legislation had ground to
a halt by January 1968.73 Regardless of the fact that they were in
fact rooted in segregation, the riots created a backlash. Exploiting
White fear coming out of the riots, conservative forces picked up
many seats in the 1966 election, and Ronald Reagan rose to
prominence as the governor of California.74
As had happened with Humphrey twenty years prior, it was
left to a young Minnesotan to spur representatives to abandon their
course of inaction. With fair housing in a tough political spot, thirtyeight-year-old Walter Mondale was able to take leadership on the
issue.75 Ed Brooke of Massachusetts and Mondale co-authored a
strong new fair housing amendment to an unrelated bill already
moving through the Senate.76 By pre-arrangement Humphrey
himself was presiding over the bill and allowed Mondale to offer the
amendment.77

69. Walter F. Mondale, Afterword: Ending Segregation: The Fair Housing Act’s
Unfinished Business, in THE FIGHT FOR FAIR HOUSING: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES,
AND FUTURE IMPLICATIONS OF THE 1968 FAIR HOUSING ACT 291, 291–96 (Gregory
Squires ed., 2017) [hereinafter Mondale, Afterword]; Mary Lou Finley, The Open
Housing Marches: Chicago Summer ‘66, in CHICAGO 1966: OPEN HOUSING MARCHES,
SUMMIT NEGOTIATIONS, AND OPERATION BREADBASKET 1, 1 (David J. Garrow ed.,
1989).
70. Mondale, Afterword, supra note 69, at 291.
71. CHARLES LAMB, HOUSING SEGREGATION IN SUBURBAN AMERICA SINCE 1960:
PRESIDENTIAL AND JUDICIAL POLITICS 37 (2005).
72. The Riots of the Long, Hot Summer, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA,
https://www.britannica.com/story/the-riots-of-the-long-hot-summer
[https://perma.cc/SYR4-BGHV].
73. Mondale, Afterword, supra note 69, at 291; see also LAMB, supra note 71, at
43–45 (noting that the legislation likely would not have later passed in 1968 had Dr.
King not been murdered).
74. Cathleen Decker, Analysis: Watts Riots Shifted State to the Right, But New
Demographics Pushed It Left, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2015), https://www.latimes.com/
local/politics/la-me-pol-watts-politics-20150806-story.html [https://perma.cc/W2SJ5YU2].
75. Mondale’s account of the passage of the Fair Housing Act is available in
several sources. See, e.g., Walter F. Mondale, Address to the 2015 National Fair
Housing Conference (Sept. 1, 2015); Mondale, Afterword, supra note 69.
76. Mondale, Afterword, supra note 69, at 291.
77. Id.
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Southern senators launched a filibuster against the bill, and
three cloture votes failed.78 But on the day of the third vote, the
Kerner Commission, tasked by President Johnson with uncovering
the roots of the 1967 riots, finally released its report.79 It attributed
the riots to “residential segregation and the conditions of the
ghetto.”80 Helpfully, the report urged passage of a comprehensive
fair housing bill to prevent similar riots.81
The Kerner report’s breadth and strong prescriptive
conclusions jarred the fair housing law out of gridlock.82 Several
years earlier, in 1966, Minority Leader Dirksen had declared
Mondale’s fair housing proposal unconstitutional.83 But with calls
for action now coming from the public, from civil rights leaders, and
from the Kerner Commission, he now expressed openness to
compromise.84 With assistance from President Johnson, the bill
passed the Senate.85
In the House, the law stalled again, this time in the Rules
Committee.86 But on April 4th, Dr. King was shot in Memphis,
triggering riots nationwide, with one of the most severe outbreaks
of violence happening in Washington, D.C. itself.87 Forced to react,
the House passed the bill on April 10th, and the Fair Housing Act
was signed into law the next day.88
In 2017, Mondale would reflect on the Act:
Above all Congress intended—as the Supreme Court recently
held—that the Fair Housing Act serve as a new, powerful tool
to end racial residential segregation and to replace racial
ghettoes with vibrant and racially integrated neighborhoods.
The events of the late 1960s highlighted how deeply interwoven
segregation was into the social fabric of American cities, and
how concertedly American institutions had worked to maintain
it. Racial separation, once enforced as policy, was now
perpetuated as a matter of habit through the actions of public

78. Id. At the time, sixty-seven votes were needed to end a filibuster. Id.
79. Id. at 291–92.
80. Id. at 292.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See id. (“I called President Johnson and told him that Bob Bartlett of Alaska
wanted the filibuster to remain a strong tool for small states like Alaska, but that he
also badly wanted a certain federal construction project. After a moment’s silence, I
heard the president say, ‘Thank you,’ and there was a click. Bob Bartlett voted for
cloture and we ended the filibuster . . . .”).
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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agencies and private citizens alike. Especially after the Kerner
Commission report, Congress understood that integration was
the only mechanism for attacking the root causes of the
discrimination and suffering that plagued American cities.
Halting segregation, dismantling it, and building integration
were the overriding objectives of the [Fair Housing Act], the end
goals towards which all its provisions were to be directed.89

For over a century, Minnesota has blazed a trail on civil rights
in ways large and small. Its advocates and activists were
instrumental in forging the 20th century’s civil rights movement,
and from the end of World War II, its elected leaders have been at
the front lines of the legislative battle to fulfill the promise of Brown
v. Board of Education and to make the guarantees of the Fourteenth
Amendment a lived reality in American society. These courageous
individuals risked their careers, endured threats and abuse, and
two leaders—Hubert Humphrey and Walter Mondale—paid the
ultimate political price, losing the presidency to opponents who
campaigned on White reactionary and segregationist sentiment.90
II. School Desegregation
Like in almost all of America’s major cities, schools in
Minneapolis and St. Paul were racially segregated in the first half
the 20th century.91 However, the city’s residents—and the state
government—embraced desegregation efforts more readily than
many others. Starting in the 1960s, various governmental entities
in Minnesota began to proactively attack school segregation. Minn.
Stat. § 123B.30, first enacted in 1959, forbade segregation on
penalty of losing funding:
No district shall classify its pupils with reference to race, color,
social position, or nationality, nor separate its pupils into
different schools or departments upon any of such grounds. Any
district so classifying or separating any of its pupils, or denying
school privileges to any of its pupils upon any such ground shall
forfeit its share in all apportioned school funds for any
apportionment period in which such classification, separation,
or exclusion shall occur or continue.92

In 1967, the state added an additional anti-segregation
provision to the Minnesota Human Rights Act forbidding local

89. Id.
90. See LAMB, supra note 71, at 45; DELTON, supra note 4, at xii–xiii.
91. Greta Kaul, With Covenants, Racism Was Written into Minneapolis Housing.
The Scars Are Still Visible, MINNPOST (Feb. 22, 2019), https://www.minnpost.com/
metro/2019/02/with-covenants-racism-was-written-into-minneapolis-housing-thescars-are-still-visible/ [https://perma.cc/36YZ-2UZD].
92. MINN. STAT. § 123B.30 (2020).
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school districts from “discriminat[ing] in any manner in the full
utilization of or benefit from any educational institution, or the
services rendered thereby to any person because of race, color,
creed . . . .”93 Discrimination is expressly defined to include
segregation or separation.94 The law also defined a discriminatory
practice to “exclude, expel, or otherwise discriminate against a
person seeking admission as a student, or a person enrolled as a
student because of race, color, creed . . . .”95
By the early 1970s, state educational policy started
galvanizing against segregation in earnest. Although federal law
had begun to distinguish between de jure and de facto segregation,
the Minnesota Board of Education announced its intention to
regulate and reduce both types in 1967.96 In 1973, the Minnesota
Department of Education promulgated its first desegregation rule.97
This rule applied flexible racial ratios in accordance with the
Supreme Court’s approved remedial framework outlined in Swann
v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education.98
Near simultaneously, local efforts to end racial segregation in
schools begin to bear fruit—although not without some resistance
in local government. In the late 1960s, a collection of parents sought
to combine two South Minneapolis elementary schools, Field and
Hale, one of which was predominantly Black and the other of which
was predominantly White.99 After successfully combining, both
schools served all children in the area, with students attending Hale
kindergarten through third grade and Field fourth through sixth
grade.100
A federal school desegregation lawsuit, Booker v. Special
School District No. 1, was filed against Minneapolis, resulting in a
court-enforced desegregation order in 1972.101 The decision creating
the order cited “optional attendance zones,” the “size and location of
93. MINN. STAT. § 363A.13(1) (2020).
94. MINN. STAT. § 363A.03(13) (2020).
95. MINN. STAT. § 363A.13(2) (2020).
96. See State of Minn. Dep’t of Child., Families, & Learning, Statement of Need
and Reasonableness, In the Matter of Proposed Rules Relating to Desegregation:
Minnesota Rules Chapter 3535 (3535.0100 to 3535.0180) (1998) [hereinafter 1998
SONAR] (discussing the history of desegregation efforts and regulations in
Minnesota).
97. See id.
98. Id. at 2; see Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
99. See, e.g., Brandt Williams, 40 Years Later, Minneapolis Parents Recall
Bussing’s Start, MPR NEWS (May 4, 2012), https://www.mprnews.org/story/2012/
05/04/minneapolis-busing-40-year-anniversary [https://perma.cc/CJ2Z-P6MN].
100. See id.
101. See Booker v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 351 F. Supp. 799 (D. Minn. 1972).
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schools,” “transfer policies,” and “racially motivated” boundaries as
evidence of de jure segregation by the district.102 For the following
decade, the court helped guide policies such as school boundary
decisions and conducted annual reviews of the district’s progress
towards integration.103
In the mid and late 1970s, the Minneapolis district and the
state battled over the scope and reach of Minnesota desegregation
rules. In 1978, the state released an administrative rule that would
regulate not just intentional de jure segregation but also de facto
segregation.104 Local districts argued such a rule was
impermissible, but in a 1978 Statement of Need and
Reasonableness (SONAR), the Minnesota Attorney General and
statewide Board of Education declared that such authorities were
clearly intended by the state legislature.105
The Minneapolis district retaliated by challenging the state’s
authority to regulate de facto segregation in administrative
proceedings, both on constitutional and state law grounds.106 An
administrative law judge upheld the state’s regulation of de facto
segregation and rejected every aspect of Minneapolis’s challenge.107
The judge found ample constitutional grounding for Minnesota’s
rules in the Supreme Court’s 1971 Swann decision, which clearly
distinguished between target racial ratios and prohibited quotas or
racial balancing.108 The opinion upheld the state’s authority to
forbid de facto segregation by examining the § 123B.30 statutory
prohibition of segregation and the even broader prohibition of the
Minnesota Human Rights Act.109 The opinion noted that the
legislature had acquiesced to these regulations by repeatedly
102. Id. at 804, 809.
103. Many of the records related to the Booker decision are difficult to access today
and perhaps lost altogether—a not uncommon predicament for desegregation
plaintiffs. However, in 1978, midway through the courts’ oversight of the Booker
decision, one challenge to the case rose to the federal circuit courts, where it was
defeated. See Booker v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 585 F.2d 347 (8th Cir. 1978).
104. See State of Minn. Dep’t of Educ., In the Matter of: The Proposed
Amendments to Rules of the State Board of Education Governing Equality of
Educational Opportunity and School Desegregation, Statement of Need and
Reasonableness (1978).
105. Id.
106. See State of Minn. Off. of Hearing Exam’rs, Rep. of Hearing Exam’r, In the
Matter of the Proposed Adoption of Rules of the State Board of Education Governing
the Standard for Determining School Segregation and Community Services Dealing
Specifically with the Limitations on Aids and Levies and the Annual Reporting Data
(1978).
107. See id.
108. Id. at 1.
109. Id. at 4.
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funding transportation, construction, and other activities
undertaken in the course of desegregation.110
By the early 1980s, much of the resistance to school
desegregation in the Twin Cities had faded into apparent
consensus. The legal and policy worlds seemed to agree:
Minnesota’s desegregation efforts were working. The Minneapolis
desegregation order was dissolved in 1983 to give the district “the
opportunity for autonomous compliance with constitutional
standards.”111 Notably, the court did not find that the Minneapolis
school district was integrated or unitary, and received assurances
that the State Department of Education was “willing and able to
assume the duty of monitoring the further implementation of the
District’s desegregation/integration plan.”112
A. The Rise of School Choice
Starting in the late 1980s, school diversity increased rapidly
in Minnesota. While most non-White segregation had previously
been between schools in the same district—primarily in
Minneapolis and St. Paul—now, interdistrict segregation, where
entire districts were racially isolated, had begun to grow rapidly.113
As strong as the existing desegregation rules were in Minnesota,
they imposed no interdistrict remedies—meaning districts, acting
alone, could not avoid becoming segregated if their demographics
shifted too much.
These shifts brought a wave of new attention to the problem of
racial segregation. But while Minnesota had historically confronted
segregation head-on with strong integration measures, this time
would be different. Many of the state’s public and private leaders
and advocates would instead promote remedies that avoided
integration—or worse, increased segregation outright—in
misguided attempts to eliminate the harms of segregation without
eliminating the thing itself.114
In a national context, the most significant of these efforts was
the invention of the charter school and the expansion of school

110. Id. at 3.
111. Booker v. Special School District No. 1, No. 4-71 Civ. 382, slip op. at 5 (D.
Minn. June 8, 1983).
112. Id. at 4.
113. MYRON ORFIELD, METROPOLITICS: A REGIONAL AGENDA FOR COMMUNITY AND
STABILITY 39-41 (Brookings Inst. & Lincoln Inst. of Land Pol’y eds., 1997).
114. See Rachel Cohen, The Untold History of Charter Schools, DEMOCRACY (Apr.
27, 2017), https://democracyjournal.org/arguments/the-untold-history-of-charterschools/ [https://perma.cc/8S87-MRRZ].
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choice. Although the name and the idea of independent schools
stretched back decades, the modern concept of a school choice was
born in Minnesota in the late 1980s.115 A Minnesota reformer, Ted
Kolderie, developed a theory of how education could be improved by
inserting market-like competition into the supposedly monopolistic,
non-competitive system governed by school boards.116 Although
Kolderie’s initial broad proposal did not explicitly position itself as
an alternative to segregation, it did identify segregated urban
schools as the areas in need of reform.117 Another Minnesota-based
education reformer, Joe Nathan, spent much of the 1980s working
with conservative governors to increase support for greater school
choice, including vouchers.118
Some Minnesota policymakers and advocates seized on the
ideas of Nathan and Kolderie as the vehicle to address the state’s
growing educational inequities. The Citizens League, a major
nonprofit in the Twin Cities area, developed these early charter
ideas into the nation’s first complete proposal for the creation of
charter schools.119 The Citizens League proposal addressed the
elephant in the room—desegregation—head-on. The proposal
argued that, absent a charter school plan, the Twin Cities would
have no choice but to adopt strong desegregation remedies,
including redrawing or merging existing school districts.120 This
dramatic reconfiguration was put forward as the only alternative to
the creation of Minnesota charter schools.121
Throughout this process, advocates of charter schools and
school choice received support from groups positioned on the centerright and center-left. The Minnesota Business Partnership, which
represented the leadership of some of the state’s largest companies,
heavily endorsed the idea of choice-based school reform.122 The
Progressive Policy Institute, a think tank founded by Bill Clinton’s
Democratic Leadership Council, consulted with Kolderie in 1990,
and Kolderie subsequently produced policy papers about choice for

115.
116.
117.
118.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. See also EMBER REICHGOTT JUNGE, ZERO CHANCE OF PASSAGE: THE
PIONEERING CHARTER SCHOOL STORY (Beaver’s Pond Press ed., 2012) for a brief
history of the Minnesota roots of charter schools.
119. Cohen, supra note 114.
120. See CITIZENS LEAGUE, CITIZENS LEAGUE REPORT: CHARTERED SCHOOLS =
CHOICES FOR EDUCATIONS + QUALITY FOR ALL STUDENTS (1988).
121. Id. at 19-20.
122. See JUNGE, supra note 118.
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the Institute.123 Ultimately, Minnesota enacted some of the nation’s
earliest and strongest school choice measures. These included an
expansive open enrollment law in 1987 and the nation’s first charter
school law in 1992.124
Minnesota’s charter schools were deeply segregated from the
very beginning. Today, almost all of the Twin Cities’ most
segregated schools—both non-White and White—are charters.125
Charter schools facilitate segregation in a number of ways.
First, as schools of choice, they have proven convenient
vehicles for White flight from diverse traditional public schools.126
Although all children are equally eligible to enroll in a charter, not
every child is equally able to attend, due to practical obstacles such
as transportation or curricular concerns.127 As a consequence,
heavily White charters have experienced very rapid growth in Twin
Cities suburbs, where traditional schools are quickly becoming
more diverse.128
In addition, charters are forced to recruit their student bodies
from the student population, and many have opted to do so by
billing themselves as racially targeted or culturally focused.129
Minnesota is home to Afro-, Hmong-, Latino-, and Somali-centric
charter schools, which explicitly recruit students on claimed
commonalities.130 Although there are no explicitly Whitesegregated charter schools, there are a number of Europeanoriented schools, such as a Russian language charter (96% White)
and a classical academy (76% White).131 In one particularly
egregious case, a German immersion charter, which was 88%
White, opened nine blocks from a traditional public school serving
the same grades, which was only 8% White.132

123. Cohen, supra note 114.
124. See JUNGE, supra note 118.
125. INST. ON METRO. OPPORTUNITY, THE MINNESOTA SCHOOL CHOICE PROJECT:
PART I: SEGREGATION AND PERFORMANCE 2 (2017), https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1125&context=imo_studies [hereinafter MINN. SCHOOL
CHOICE PROJECT] [https://perma.cc/B86U-5HH6].
126. Id. at 9.
127. INST. ON METRO. OPPORTUNITY, FAILED PROMISES: ASSESSING CHARTER
SCHOOLS IN THE TWIN CITIES 44-46 (2008) [hereinafter FAILED PROMISES].
128. See MINN. SCHOOL CHOICE PROJECT, supra note 125; INST. ON METRO.
OPPORTUNITY, CHARTER SCHOOLS IN THE TWIN CITIES: 2013 UPDATE 1 (2013); FAILED
PROMISES, supra note 127.
129. Will Stancil, Charter Schools and School Desegregation Law, 44 MITCHELL
HAMLINE L. REV. 455, 480 (2018).
130. See id. at 473–81; FAILED PROMISES, supra note 127.
131. Stancil, supra note 129, at 477-78.
132. Id. at 456.
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As a result of these dynamics, and as the recipients of a
blanket exemption from the state desegregation rule, charters are
overwhelmingly more segregated than their traditional school
counterparts. Of the 50 most segregated schools in the Twin Cities
region, 45 are charters.133 The region contains 78 schools that are
more than 95% non-White; 59 are charters.134 Out of all charter
enrollees, 72% of Black students, 68% of Hispanic students, and
74% of Asian students are attending a highly segregated, more than
90% non-White, school.135 At traditional schools, the equivalent
figures are 16%, 11%, and 18%, respectively. Similarly high levels
of segregation have existed at charters since at least the 1995-1996
school year.136
Minnesota’s other major school choice mechanism, open
enrollment, has also come to severely worsen segregation.137
Initially, open enrollment options were limited by desegregation
rules—a student could not enroll into a new district if the change
would worsen segregation.138 But the policy was exempted from
desegregation rules in 2001, and additional resegregation followed
rapidly.139
A 2013 study examined the effect of open enrollment on
district demographics. In the 2000-2001 school year, 12% of White
students’ open enrollment moves were integrative in effect, and 20%
were segregative in effect.140 The remainder were neutral (i.e.,
between two similarly composed school districts).141 By 2010, over a
third—36%—were segregative in effect, while 19% were integrative
in effect.142
The school districts most affected by open enrollment are those
in rapidly diversifying suburbs, where the policy provides an escape
route for White families concerned about integrated schools.143
These communities include Richfield, Columbia Heights, Osseo,

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

See MINN. SCHOOL CHOICE PROJECT, supra note 125.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 12-14.
Id.
See INST. ON METRO. OPPORTUNITY, OPEN ENROLLMENT AND RACIAL
SEGREGATION (2013) [hereinafter OPEN ENROLLMENT AND RACIAL SEGREGATION].
138. See Margaret C. Hobday, Geneva Finn & Myron Orfield, A Missed
Opportunity: Minnesota’s Failed Experiment with Choice-based Integration, 35 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 936, 953–55 (2009).
139. See id. at 959.
140. OPEN ENROLLMENT AND RACIAL SEGREGATION, supra note 137, at 7.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 9.
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and Robbinsdale.144 Meanwhile, a number of districts serve as
White flight hubs, receiving a significant portion of their overall
student body as open enrollees from neighboring districts.145 These
include St. Anthony, Mahtomedi, Edina, and Minnetonka.146
Some districts have utilized open enrollment and diversifying
neighborhoods as a strategy for recruiting wealthier student bodies.
For example, four districts bordering the Minnetonka district have
officially considered or implemented integrative boundary
changes.147 While its neighbors considered these plans, the
Minnetonka school district launched an expensive and unusual paid
advertising plan in local newspapers, television, and radio.148
According to superintendents of neighboring districts, the
Minnetonka district was engaged in an active effort to recruit
skittish parents.149 Not only could these efforts increase White
segregation in Minnetonka schools, but they undermine attempts
by neighboring districts to maintain demographically balanced
schools.
B. Conflict Over Minnesota’s Desegregation Rules in the
1990s
While Minnesota was introducing new school choice
mechanisms that increased segregation, it was also weathering a
conflict over the desegregation rules that existed in the early 1990s.
A new rule was adopted in 1999 that reflected the views of
integration skeptics, which led to additional legal and political
conflict over segregation that continues to the present day.150 Over
time, many of the groups that had been previously involved in
efforts for greater school choice enmeshed themselves in the
desegregation rule battle. In fact, some of the strongest and most
vocal advocates for reduced desegregation have been the very
charter schools that Minnesota created in the early 1990s.151
In 1994, the Minnesota State Board of Education proposed a
metropolitan-wide desegregation rule to resolve the growing
144. Id.
145. See id.
146. See id.
147. Id. at 19; see also Anthony Lonetree & MaryJo Webster, Open Enrollment
Keeps Students, Resources Flowing into Minnetonka, STAR TRIB. (Jan. 13, 2018),
https://www.startribune.com/open-enrollment-keeps-students-resources-flowinginto-minnetonka/469168323/ [https://perma.cc/N9RL-HTDT].
148. Lonetree & Webster, supra note 147.
149. Id.
150. Hobday et al., supra note 138, at 958-63.
151. See id.
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problem of interdistrict segregation.152 The rule used flexible racial
ratios as integration targets.153 A draft of the rule was provided to
the Minnesota legislature, which indicated its approval by
authorizing the Board to make new rules.154 The authorization
contained important limitations to ensure the Board directly
addressed the question of segregation: “In adopting a rule related
to school desegregation/integration, the state board shall address
the need for equal educational opportunities for all students and
racial balance as defined by the state board.”155 In the same law, the
legislature established a new “office of desegregation/integration” to
“coordinate and support activities” related to interdistrict
integration efforts.156
But before they could be promulgated, the newly proposed
rules were swallowed by a sharp political backlash, spurred in part
by the suburbs’ sudden inclusion in civil rights regulation.157
Katherine Kersten, a conservative political columnist for the Star
Tribune, launched frequent attacks against the proposal, and Bob
Wedl, the Assistant Commissioner of the Department of Education,
began to lobby for an alternative, “voluntary” integration
approach.158 Talk radio also pilloried the proposed rules and a
separate, related set of “diversity rules.”159 The Department of
Education received “hundreds of calls and letters concerning the
proposed rules–including two death threats.”160 After years in
limbo, the second set of rules was withdrawn, and soon thereafter,
the State Board of Education was abolished altogether.161
The governor’s office and particularly the Attorney General’s
office were asked to respond to the controversy. The governor’s office
was silent. Although the Chief Deputy Attorney General, John
Tunheim, had been long supportive of civil rights, he was
nominated by President Clinton in June of 1995 to be a federal
judge for the District of Minnesota, removing him from the
debate.162
152. Id. at 953.
153. Id. at 954.
154. Id. at 955.
155. Minn. Stat. § 121.11 subd. 7d(b) (1994).
156. Minn. Stat. § 121.1601 (1994).
157. See Hobday et al., supra note 138, at 951.
158. Id. at 951-58.
159. Id. at 957-58.
160. Id. at 958.
161. Id.
162. Tunheim, John R., FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/history/judges/
tunheim-john-r [https://perma.cc/J3FA-S9S9].
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Tunheim’s replacement, Lee Sheehy, appeared to have very
different views on the advisability of desegregation. Sheehy was an
ally of Minnesota Attorney General Hubert “Skip” Humphrey III,
who was at the time running for governor.163 Both Sheehy and
Humphrey were members of the moderate center wing of the
Democratic Party—a wing that, during the Clinton years, was
defined in part by its intense concern about the political costs of
Democrats’ traditional defense of civil rights for Black
Americans.164 School integration in particular, which raised the
bogeyman of “forced” busing, was considered too toxic a subject for
any Democrat.165 Democratic politicians especially feared the
impact of desegregation on suburban voters and believed that
aggressive desegregation plans would so alienate and anger White
suburban voters that statewide political victories would become
impossible.166 Under Sheehy, the tenor of the Attorney General’s
office towards the proposed desegregation rules changed
dramatically.
Sheehy was not the only individual in the Minnesota Attorney
General’s office hostile to the new desegregation plan. An Assistant
Attorney General, Cindy Lavorato, took a major role in the conflict
over the rule. Lavorato was the daughter-in-law of James I. Rice,
25-year state house member and powerful committee chair.167
Lavorato would distinguish herself over the next two decades as one
of the state’s most tireless opponents of school integration.168
163. See Lee Sheehy, LIVING CITIES, https://livingcities.org/people/lee-sheehy/
[https://perma.cc/267E-XV4N] (listing Sheehy as Attorney General Hubert
Humphrey’s Chief Deputy).
164. See generally, see generally THOMAS EDSALL & MARY D. EDSALL, CHAIN
REACTION: THE IMPACT OF RACE, RIGHTS, AND TAXES ON AMERICAN POLITICS (1992)
for a survey of the views on race that motivated moderate Democrats in the 1990s.
165. See id. at 143.
166. Cf. id. (positing that “[t]he positions adopted by the national Democratic
party in favor of racial preferences and busing were critical in allowing the national
Republican party to take over the political and philosophical center.”).
167. Louis A. Lavorato, IOWA JUD. BRANCH, https://www.iowacourts.gov/for-thepublic/educational-resources-and-services/iowa-courts-history/past-justices/louis-alavorato [https://perma.cc/DR58-MC3F]; Rice, James Isaac “Jim”, MINN. LEGIS. REF.
LIBR., https://www.lrl.mn.gov/legdb/fulldetail?ID=10561 [https://perma.cc/9KZQBUH4].
168. For instance, when the state attempted to modify the integration rule in 2016
to include charter schools, Lavorato was hired as the primary representative of
charters in the rulemaking proceedings, testifying extensively against the change
and submitting several lengthy sets of written comments. See Transcript of Public
Hearing, In the Matter of Proposed Rules Governing Achievement and Integration,
State of Minn. Off. of Admin. Hearings for the Minn. Dep’t of Educ. (No. 65-130032227) (Jan. 7, 2016) [hereinafter Public Hearing Transcript]; Memorandum of Law
in Support of the Disapproval of MDE’S Proposed Desegregation/Integration Rules
Due to Four Substantive Defects, In the Matter of Proposed Rules Governing
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In addition to the rulemaking, several other events brought
the conflict over integration to a head. First, the Minneapolis school
district proposed ending its existing school assignment plan, which
had been in operation since the 1970s, mostly under a desegregation
court order.169 In its place, the district sought to implement a
“neighborhood schools” plan, which would leave the racially
segregated areas of the city attending equally segregated schools.170
Second, the Minneapolis NAACP filed a lawsuit against the
state of Minnesota, bringing novel state-law claims that the schools
were impermissibly segregated.171 The lawsuit’s plaintiffs sought,
in particular, interdistrict desegregation mechanisms in an attempt
to stem the problem of interdistrict segregation that had been
growing since the late 1980s.172
In short, the pro- and anti-integration forces begin to cohere
into discrete camps. On the pro-integration side was arrayed the
NAACP, traditional civil rights organizations, the State Board of
Education with its newly proposed rule, and the lawsuit plaintiffs.
But that could scarcely compare to the strength of the antiintegration side, which included most of the top figures at the
Attorney General’s office: Assistant Commissioner Wedl and the
powerful columnist Kersten.173
As the defense against the NAACP lawsuit began to merge
with the larger question of the new statewide integration rule, the
anti-integrationists began to pull in outside aid. The 1996 budget
provided the state education department $700,000 for costs related
to litigation of the NAACP lawsuit.174 While records showing the
full use of this expenditure are lost, at least several telling facts are
known.
Kersten, the conservative columnist, had recommended that
the state seek the aid of Alfred Lindseth, a politically-connected,
conservative lawyer and longtime opponent of desegregation

Achievement and Integration (OAH 1300-32227), State of Minn. Off. of Admin.
Hearings; Memorandum of Law in Support of the Disapproval of MDE’s Proposed
Desegregation/Integration Rules as Fatally Defective, In the Matter of Proposed
Rules Governing Achievement and Integration (OAH 1300-32227), State of Minn.
Off. of Admin. Hearings.
169. Hobday et al., supra note 138, at 956.
170. Myron Orfield, Choice, Equal Protection, and Metropolitan Integration: The
Hope of the Minneapolis Desegregation Settlement, 24 LAW & INEQ. 269, 298 (2006).
171. Id. at 311-12.
172. Id.
173. See Hobday et al., supra note 138 (providing an overview of the conflict over
integration in the Minnesota state government in the 1990s).
174. 1996 Minn. Laws 739, ch. 471, art. 11, § 4, subd. 2 (1996).
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plans.175 Lindseth had taken a particularly active role opposing and
dismantling integration plans in southern states, like North
Carolina and Georgia. His clients often included school districts
fighting court-ordered integration, and he appeared for the
defendants in seminal desegregation cases like Jenkins v. Missouri
and Sheff v. O’Neill.176 Minnesota later hired Lindseth to work on
its desegregation defense.177
Next, the Attorney General’s office and state education
department hired two national experts, David Armor and Christine
Rossell, who had made their names fighting desegregation lawsuits
in previous decades.178 Indeed, Armor and Rossell had been so
prominent resisting integration that they had turned it into a
cottage industry. Armor states that he has appeared in over 50
segregation cases and authored a book chapter about the experience
of serving as an expert witness for school districts trying to escape
court orders;179 Rossell appears to have appeared as a defense-side
expert in over 75 cases.180 Indeed, the pair held a virtual monopoly
over this lucrative market sector. When the U.S. Supreme Court
considered desegregation in the 2007 case Parents Involved in
Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, over 550 social
scientists filed or signed amicus briefs in support of integration.181
Rossell and Armor were two of six experts filing briefs for the
plaintiffs attempting to eliminate integration plans.182 Both Armor

175. KATHERINE KERSTEN, GOOD INTENTIONS ARE NOT ENOUGH. THE PERIL
POSED BY MINNESOTA’S NEW DESEGREGATION PLAN 58 (1995).
176. See, e.g., Scott Shepard, Court-Ordered Busing Is Running Out of Gas;
Desegregation Tool Falls Out of Favor; Focus of Battle Is Shifting to State; Courts,
ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH (Apr. 8, 1998), [https://perma.cc/SD6D-VJPE]; George
Judson, When Good Will Is Not Enough: Desegregation Project at Heart of Hartford
School Suit, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 1, 1993), [https://perma.cc/HD3J-VYVB].
177. See Alfred A. Lindseth, EVERSHEDS SUTHERLAND, https://us.evershedssutherland.com/People/Alfred-A-Lindseth [https://perma.cc/CB2T-222T].
178. Hobday et al., supra note 138, at 961-964.
179. David J. Armor, Reflections of an Expert Witness, in THE END OF
DESEGREGATION? 3-23 (Stephen J. Caldas & Carl L. Bankston eds., 2003); Biography
of David J. Armor, SCHAR SCH. OF POL’Y AND GOV’T, GEO. MASON,
https://schar.gmu.edu/about/faculty-directory/david-j-armor [https://perma.cc/2X6G66NX].
180. Curriculum
Vitae
of
Christine
Rossell,
POL.
SCI.,
B.U.,
https://www.bu.edu/polisci/files/2020/10/Rossell-Vita-10-13-20.pdf
[https://perma.cc/539W-A9UV].
181. See Brief of 553 Social Scientists in Support of Respondents, Parents
Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
182. See Brief of Amici Curiae Drs. Murphy, Rossell and Walberg in Support of
Petitioners, Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School Dist. No. 1,
551 U.S. 701 (2007); Brief of David J. Armor, Abigail Thernstrom, and Stephan
Thernstrom as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
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and Rossell had frequently been employed by Lindseth in past antiintegration endeavors.183
Both the lawsuit and the rulemaking process wound to a
conclusion in the late 1990s. As a result of conflicts related to the
integration rule, the State Board of Education was ultimately
abolished and replaced by a Commissioner of Education.184
Meanwhile, the Department of Education and the Attorney
General’s office had already begun to strip the strongest
desegregation tools out of the Board’s original proposal.185
But one major twist remained. On September 17, 1998, the
Attorney General’s office released a Statement of Need and
Reasonableness (SONAR) that unexpectedly and dramatically
weakened the proposed integration rule.186 The newly released
SONAR, authored by Cindy Lavorato, marked a sharp break with
previous iterations of the rule.187 It altered the definition of
segregation to only include intentional, de jure discrimination,
limited the mandatory interdistrict integration requirements, and
raised the standard for proving intentional discrimination far above
that required by the U.S. Supreme Court.188 The SONAR also
argued that interdistrict open enrollment rules could not be guided
by integration requirements, and, on policy grounds, it exempted
charter schools from its provisions altogether, though they had
previously been subject to desegregation rules.189
Although the lawsuit defense and rulemaking were nominally
separate, Lindseth’s influence on the rulemaking process was clear.
Several passages of the SONAR closely resembled passages he had
published.190 In addition, the SONAR contained a number of legal
conclusions that exhibited obvious hostility to the notion of school
integration—and echoed prior Lindseth arguments.191 The SONAR
concluded that there was no compelling government interest in K12 integration absent proof of intentional discrimination—limiting

183. See, e.g., David Armor, Why the Gap Between Black and White Performance
in School? (Testimony of David James Armor, March 5, 6, & 22, 1995), 66 J. Negro
Educ. 311; Stell v. Bd. of Pub. Educ., 724 F. Supp. 1384, 1393–96 (S.D. Ga. 1988).
184. Hobday et al., supra note 138, at 958.
185. Id. at 958-960.
186. See 1998 SONAR, supra note 96.
187. Hobday et al., supra note 138, at 955.
188. See 1998 SONAR, supra note 96.
189. Id. at 30.
190. Id.;
Alfred
A.
Lindseth,
Legal
Issues
Related
to
School
Funding/Desegregation, in SCHOOL DESEGREGATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY 41
(Christine H. Rossell, David J. Armor & Herbert J. Walberg eds., 2002).
191. See, e.g., Lindseth, supra note 190.
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districts’ abilities to voluntarily implement integration plans.192
Although this determination appeared to directly contradict the
U.S. Supreme Court’s most recent precedents, the SONAR based its
conclusion on a prediction that Supreme Court justice retirements
would result in a change to the law.193 It noted that one 5-4 decision
in 1990 “is surely the high water mark for diversity as a justification
for racial preference.”194 Tellingly, the SONAR made a concerted
effort to downplay the meaning and scope of Brown v. Board of
Education, stating that the case “did not stand for the proposition
that racially segregated schools, without more, are inherently
equal.”195 At one point, the SONAR even appears to engage in an
extended apologia for segregated schools:
Throughout the United States, such public schools have tackled
some of the toughest problems in urban education and been
successful. These exemplary schools are located in some of the
poorest inner-city neighborhoods, serving student bodies that
are largely poor and minority . . . .
It is certainly not the intent of the rule to promote racial
separatism; however, it is important to understand that a
desegregation rule is not unreasonable, or ineffective, simply
because some schools may remain racially identifiable.196

It is impossible to detach the SONAR’s substance from the
deeply politicized environment that surrounded its release. The
state was in the final stretch of a gubernatorial contest. Only three
weeks prior to the SONAR’s release by the Attorney General’s office,
Attorney General Skip Humphrey had won the Democratic Party’s
nomination for the governorship.197 Several weeks after its release,
Bob Wedl, now Commissioner of Education, announced that his new
rule would end racial quotas.198 The day after the new rule was
announced, local conservative columnist Katherine Kersten used
the issue of integration in a newspaper column to frame the
differences between Humphrey and his opponent, Norm
Coleman.199 At a time when virtually all national political figures
192. 1998 SONAR, supra note 96, at 17.
193. Id.
194. Id. (quoting Richard Kahlenberg, Class Based Affirmative Action, 84 CALIF.
L. REV. 1037, 1039 (1996)).
195. Id. at B1.
196. Id. at 60–61.
197. See, e.g., Dane Smith & Robert Whereatt, Coleman, Humphrey Ready for
Showdown, STAR TRIB. (Sept. 16, 1998) [https://perma.cc/VCK9-9K2P].
198. See, e.g., Norman Draper, Plan Would End State’s Race Quotas for Schools,
STAR TRIB. (Oct. 6, 1998), [https://perma.cc/JMF4-4UG7]; State Leaders Drafting
New Plan for Desegregation in Schools, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS (Aug. 28, 1998),
[https://perma.cc/MUZ6-E6D5].
199. Katherine Kersten, Coleman Has a Better Plan for Governing Minnesota,
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were opposed to school desegregation, elevation of the issue in an
election season could only augur badly for integration.
The new Minnesota Desegregation/Integration Rule, with the
limitations imposed by the SONAR, was finally adopted in early
1999.200 Shortly thereafter, a number of other integration policies
in Minnesota schools came under legal attack by White parents,
who echoed the SONAR’s claim that there was no compelling
governmental interest in K-12 integration absent intentional
discrimination.201 Fearing legal reprisals, many districts
abandoned previous integration plans.202 The NAACP lawsuit, after
a twisting legal path, concluded in a settlement in 2000.203 That
settlement instituted a voluntary transportation program to help
low-income Black children from Minneapolis’s North Side attend
affluent suburban schools—although some of the most affluent
suburban schools refused to opt into the program.204
C. Continuing Conflicts Over Segregation in Minnesota
Schools
In the two decades following the implementation of
Minnesota’s weakened desegregation rule, many of the battles from
the 1990s have recurred, sometimes in eerily similar fashion, and
even featuring the same cast of characters.
The 1999 rule has failed to stem or slow segregation.205 If
anything, the degree of segregation in Minnesota schools has grown
sharply.206 As discussed above, this is particularly true of charter
schools, which account for a hugely disproportionate share of the
state’s most racially isolated schools.
Nor have the 1999 rule’s legal conclusions withstood the test
of time. Most importantly, the rule completely missed the mark
with its suggestion that K-12 integration is not, or would be found
not to be, a compelling government interest.207 In 2007, the
Supreme Court, in Parents Involved in Community Schools v.
Seattle School District No. 1, confirmed the existence of a
compelling government interest in encouraging diversity and
STAR TRIB. (Oct. 7, 1998), [https://perma.cc/L6Z8-P2RM].
200. Hobday et al., supra note 138, at 958.
201. Orfield, supra note 170, at 306.
202. Hobday et al., supra note 138, at 965–66.
203. Orfield, supra note 170, at 314.
204. See id. at 315.
205. Hobday et al., supra note 138, at 965.
206. Orfield, supra note 170, at 299–300.
207. Hobday et al., supra note 138, at 959.
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avoiding racial isolation in K-12 education.208 It also reaffirmed the
viability of several integration methods, such as the use of flexible
racial ratios.209 Justice Kennedy, whose opinion was controlling,
wrote passionately in defense of integration:
This Nation has a moral and ethical obligation to fulfill its
historic commitment to creating an integrated society that
ensures equal opportunity for all of its children. A compelling
interest exists in avoiding racial isolation, an interest that a
school district, in its discretion and expertise, may choose to
pursue. Likewise, a district may consider it a compelling
interest to achieve a diverse student population.210

In similar fashion, the legality of the rule’s charter school
exemption has been called into question. In 2014, the U.S.
Department of Education released guidance strongly suggesting
that the exemptions are unconstitutional, because they allow a
separate state-supported school district to interfere with and
undermine the efforts of the state to integrate a segregated
system.211 The Department’s official guidance document declared
that “[c]harter schools located in a district subject to a
desegregation plan (whether the plan is court ordered, or required
by a Federal or State administrative entity) must be operated in a
manner consistent with that desegregation plan.”212
In 2013, the Minnesota legislature once again focused on
school segregation. It enacted yet another statutory provision
forbidding segregation, this time at Minn. Stat. § 124D.855:
SCHOOL SEGREGATION PROHIBITED.
The state,
consistent with section 123B.30 and chapter 363A, does not
condone separating school children of different socioeconomic,
demographic, ethnic, or racial backgrounds into distinct public
schools. Instead, the state’s interest lies in offering children a
diverse and nondiscriminatory educational experience.213

The legislature also created a policy task force to revise laws
governing the use of achievement and integration state aid.214 That
task force delivered recommendations, including the retention of all
208. See Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551
U.S. 701 (2007).
209. Id. at 851.
210. Id. at 797–98.
211. See Letter from Catherine E. Lhamon, Assistant Sec’y for Civil Rights at U.S.
Dep’t of Educ., Regarding Application of Civil Rights Law to Charter Schools (May
14, 2014), https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/letters/
colleague-201405-charter.pdf [https://perma.cc/UA84-3DQ7].
212. Id. at 3–4.
213. Minn. Stat. § 124D.855 (2020).
214. MINN. DEP’T OF EDUC., INTEGRATION REVENUE REPLACEMENT ADVISORY
TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS 2 (2012).
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existing remedial integration measures.215 The legislature enacted
these in 2013, as the Achievement and Integration for Minnesota
statutes, and gave the state Department of Education authority to
make rules for the new law.216 Using this authority, the Department
attempted to once again revise its desegregation rule.
In 2015, the Department released this new rule for public
notice and comment.217 The new proposal represented yet another
dramatic weakening of the state’s integration scheme. It was less
than a quarter of the length of the extant 1999 rule, eliminating
almost all of the rule’s content.218 It primarily restated statutory
provisions and lacked important definitions—including “racial
balance,” which the authorizing statute required.219 It eliminated
virtually all remedial provisions in the extant rule, and made
interdistrict remedies completely voluntary.220 Despite a statutory
instruction
to
promulgate
a
rule
relating
to
desegregation/integration, the proposal did not address
segregation; it also ignored the statutory requirement to address
the need for equal educational opportunities for all students.221 The
only significant strengthening provision was the de-exemption of
charter schools.222
A new SONAR, released in support of the proposed rule, failed
to justify most of these changes.223 The SONAR claimed that the
Department lacked statutory authority to promulgate a broad new
rule, but did not explain where it had derived the authority to repeal
the vast majority of the existing rule.224 In addition, Minnesota’s
administrative procedure laws require promulgating agencies to
delineate who will be affected by a proposed rule.225 The
215. Id. at 6 (“The new program must do the following: Develop a new and modern
integration rule that is grounded in our state’s history and law, is sustainable, but
also addresses a new vision that is measured beyond reading, writing and math and
includes a more complete measure of achievement and access to opportunity.
i. Maintain language that prohibits intentional segregation in schools.
ii. Maintain current language defining racially isolated districts . . . .
iv. Maintain current language defining racially isolated schools.”).
216. Minn. Stat. § 124D.896 (2020).
217. See MINN. DEP’T OF EDUC., STATEMENT OF NEED AND REASONABLENESS FOR
PROPOSED RULES GOVERNING ACHIEVEMENT AND INTEGRATION FOR MINNESOTA
(2015) [hereinafter 2015 SONAR] (explaining the proposed rules introduced in 2015).
218. See id.
219. See id.; Minn. Stat. § 124D.896 (2020).
220. 2015 SONAR, supra note 217, at 31.
221. See id.
222. Id. at 18.
223. See id.
224. Id. at 14.
225. Minn. Stat. § 14.05 (2020).
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Department of Education dodged this requirement, saying only that
“communities” where “achievement and integration plans are
presented at public school board meetings which allow for input”
would be affected “positively.”226 No mention of the effects on
schoolchildren was made.227 Indeed, at no point in the rulemaking
process did the Department of Education affirmatively state if it
expected the rule to reduce racial segregation in Minnesota schools.
The public hearing to the proposed rule generated
considerable resistance. Civil rights groups objected to its overall
lack of content.228 Confronted about the lack of policy support for
the rule, Department representatives confessed they had made no
attempt to model the rule’s impact on the demographic composition
of Minnesota schools.229 The Department also appeared to abandon
its earlier position that there is no compelling interest in K-12
integration.230
Meanwhile, charter schools objected to the proposed
elimination of their exemption. Representing the charters was
Cindy Lavorato.231 Lavorato, leading the charter opposition,
retained Armor and Rossell as experts—just like the state had two
decades earlier.232 The charters included sweeping legal claims
denouncing school integration as ineffective and attacking
important historic precedent on the issue, like Swann v. CharlotteMecklenburg.233 Lavorato argued that it was important for parents
to be able to choose other school features instead of integration, if
they wanted: “But not all parents and student [sic] value diversity
above all other educational needs. . . . Some families price a
premium on - and this was the case for me - small class size and a
teacher to student ratio that’s small.”234

226. 2015 SONAR, supra note 217, at 18.
227. See id.
228. See Inst. on Metro. Opportunity, Comments of the Institute on Metropolitan
Opportunity on Proposed Permanent Rules for Achievement and Integration (Jan.
27, 2016).
229. Id. at 10.
230. Id. at 36.
231. Public Hearing Transcript, supra note 168.
232. See Memorandum of Law from Charter Schools in Support of the Disapproval
of the Minn. Dep’t of Educ. Proposed Desegregation/Integration Rules Due to Four
Substantive Defects, Exh. 2–3 (OAH File No. 1300-32227).
233. See Inst. on Metro. Opportunity, Comments of the Institute on Metropolitan
Opportunity in Reply to Comments Submitted by Charter Schools, Charter Advocacy
Organizations, and Charter School Employees on Minnesota Proposed Permanent
Achievement and Integration Rule (Feb. 3, 2016) [hereinafter Feb. 3 Reply to
Comments].
234. Public Hearing Transcript, supra note 168.
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At a public hearing, over a dozen charter administrators and
representatives spoke.235 A number of charter administrators
affirmatively defended their right to operate racially-targeted
schools, arguing that “cultural focus,” in the form of segregation,
was necessary because different racial groups think and behave
differently.236 For example, the director of a Hmong-focused charter
school stated the following: “Each culture group has their own. The
Hmong, we are very quiet. We are introvert[s]. We don’t talk much.
The African-American students, they are extrovert[s]. They talk.
That’s how they are.”237
The director of the Excell Academy, which is nearly 100%
Black and low-income, relayed messages from the school’s enrollees:
“You need to think about what you are doing to people of color and
Whites. If you make a White kid go to a colored school or a colored
kid go to a White school, there are a lot of things that can go
wrong.”238
The final report disapproved of the entire proposed rule on a
variety of grounds.239 Rather than correct the defects identified by
the Administrative Law Judge, the Department of Education
abandoned the rule altogether. Although it is still required by
statute to adopt new rules that comport with the Achievement and
Integration statute, it has not done so.
This failed rulemaking dovetailed with another school
desegregation lawsuit against the state of Minnesota, called CruzGuzman v. State of Minnesota.240 Like the 1995 lawsuit, the new
plaintiffs once again argued that the state had ignored
constitutional requirements by allowing schools in Minneapolis, St.
Paul, and the suburbs to become intensely racially isolated.241
Although the lawsuit was filed against the state of Minnesota,
a collection of charter schools successfully convinced the state
district court to admit them as third-party intervenors.242 They
have remained in the suit ever since, continually lobbying the court
235. See id.
236. See id.
237. Id.
238. Id. at 159.
239. See In re Proposed Rules Relating to Achievement & Integration, OAH No.
65-1300-32227 (2016).
240. Cruz-Guzman v. State, 916 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 2018).
241. Class Action Complaint at 2, Cruz-Guzman v. State, 892 N.W.2d 533 (Minn.
Ct. App. 2017) (No. 27-CV-15-19117).
242. See, e.g., Rachel M. Cohen, School Desegregation Lawsuit Threatens
Charters, AM. PROSPECT (Jan. 26, 2016), https://prospect.org/education/schooldesegregation-lawsuit-threatens-charters/ [https://perma.cc/BE8P-43PV].
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to recognize their right to maintain separate, segregated schools
and positing that parent choice is an interest of equal or greater
importance than desegregation.243
In 2018, the Cruz-Guzman lawsuit appeared in front of the
Minnesota Supreme Court.244 At issue was the preliminary question
of whether Minnesota’s fundamental right to an education was
justiciable.245 The state argued it was not, effectively rendering the
fundamental right unenforceable.246 The charter intervenors sided
with the state.247 The court, however, sided with the plaintiffs.248 In
its decision, it unambiguously held that the Minnesota constitution
created justiciable rights for students, and, tellingly, stated that it
is “self-evident” that a segregated system of schools could not satisfy
the constitutional requirement that schools be “general,” “uniform,”
“thorough,” or “efficient.”249 The Cruz-Guzman suit entered
settlement negotiations, where it remains at the time of this
writing.250
The nearly 30-year battle over Minnesota desegregation rules
has not left the state in a better place. At present, school
desegregation in Minnesota is governed by a 1999 rule founded in
fundamental legal errors and promulgated in a highly irregular
process.251 The Department of Education has indicated that it will
not act to correct these errors until it receives additional guidance
from the legislature, but the legislature has not provided such
guidance.252 There is no indication that the political resistance that
has impeded all attempts to integrate Minnesota schools for the
past four decades will abate soon.253
243. At the time of this writing, the charter intervenors had most recently failed
in a motion seeking to be exempted from the desegregation case. Elizabeth
Shockman, Court Declines to Exempt Charters from School Segregation Case, MPR
NEWS (June 13, 2019), https://www.mprnews.org/story/2019/06/12/court-declines-toexempt-charters-from-school-segregation-case [https://perma.cc/KK7B-TGAU].
244. Cruz-Guzman, 916 N.W.2d at 1.
245. Id. at 4.
246. Id. at 7.
247. See id.
248. Id. at 15.
249. Id. at 10 n.6.
250. See, e.g., Eric Golden, School Integration Plan Awaits Minnesota Lawmaker’s
Action, May End Up Back in Court, STAR TRIB. (May 29, 2021),
https://www.startribune.com/school-integration-plan-awaits-minnesota-lawmakersaction-may-end-up-back-in-court/600062764/ [https://perma.cc/GCG5-UCBE].
251. See Minn. Dep’t of Educ., Notice of Withdrawn Proposed Rules Governing
Achievement and Integration, Minnesota Rules, ch. 3535, Revisor’s ID Number 4309
(March 21, 2016)., https://education.mn.gov/MDE/about/rule/rule/deseg/.
252. Id.
253. See, e.g., Orfield, supra note 170, at 301–02 (stating that Minneapolis School
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The new mechanisms pioneered by Minnesota to circumvent
the integration issue, charter schools and open enrollment, have
failed to close education achievement gaps, which remain among
the nation’s worst.254 Charters have produced endless conflict with
public school districts, in Minnesota and nationwide.255 Meanwhile,
the charters themselves have become some of the nation’s most
vocal neo-segregationists. Their early opposition to desegregation
has foreshadowed an ever-more-aggressive campaign for “culturally
focused” education, and explicit denunciations of integration as
unnecessary or even harmful.256 Several Minnesota charter
advocates have built national profiles as defenders of de facto school
segregation—or even intentional segregation, under the aegis of
“cultural affirmation.”257
In the meantime, the wellbeing and education of tens of
thousands of Minnesotan children is at risk, as the laws of their
state steer them towards segregated schools.
III. The Rise and Fall of Regional Housing Planning
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, Minnesota was a national
leader in regional planning. The state established a system to
ensure that its core metropolitan region was overseen by a single
government that could align metro-wide policies in a holistic,
comprehensive, and mutually beneficial fashion.258
In most states, major cities are fractured into dozens of
municipalities, each operating independently of each other—a
recipe for destructive, zero-sum competition, demographic and
economic fragmentation, and ultimately, residential exclusion.259
The inability to construct unified regional housing policy is a recipe

District enrollment continues to plummet while students instead attend problematic
charter schools).
254. See id. at 269–70.
255. See, e.g., Feb. 3 Reply to Comments, supra note 233 (detailing the debate
surrounding charter schools).
256. See, e.g., Robert Wedl & Bill Wilson, In Minnesota, We Must Think Broadly
About
School
Integration,
STAR
TRIB.
(Dec.
31,
2015),
https://www.startribune.com/in-minnesota-we-must-think-broadly-about-schoolintegration/363960211/ [https://perma.cc/LM6U-TVUA].
257. See, e.g., Chris Stewart, Our Obsession with Integration Is Hurting Kids of
Color, WASH. POST (June 10, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/intheory/wp/2016/06/10/our-obsession-with-integration-is-hurting-kids-of-color/
[https://perma.cc/X75X-HSUT].
258. Myron Orfield & Will Stancil, Why Are the Twin Cities So Segregated?, 43
MITCHELL HAMLINE L. REV. 1, 9–10 (2017).
259. See DAVID RUSK, CITIES WITHOUT SUBURBS (2013) for a discussion of urban
fragmentation.
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for the emergence of the classic urban-suburban divides that were
stereotypical of American cities in the 20th century, with whitepicket-fence suburbs doubling as gated enclaves, built to exclude
the poor and the non-White, both explicitly and implicitly.
Minnesota developed a better system. Although the Twin
Cities are divided among many municipalities, those municipalities
are subject to the authority of a regional government, the
Metropolitan Council, which has been given the tools to corral
them.260 This metropolitan government for the Twin Cities area,
known as the Met Council, has a well-established and robust state
law authority to coordinate regional policy.261 The Met Council
adopted a metropolitan land use policy requiring all suburbs
provide for their fair share of affordable housing.262 Minnesota
enacted a regional property tax base sharing act.263 In upholding
this act, the Minnesota Supreme Court declared the constitutional
interdependency of Minneapolis and its suburbs.264 By the early
1980s, the Twin Cities was one of the most integrated communities
in the nation, with some of the smallest racial disparities.265
The Met Council of the Twin Cities was also at the vanguard
of metropolitan civil rights and federal Fair Housing Act
enforcement. The Council supervised the U.S. Department of
Housing and Urban Development’s (HUD’s) Section 8 program and
was given authority to tie grants of state and federal funds to actual
progress on economic integration.266 In most places, subsidized
housing was rejected by affluent suburbanites, and segregated into
impoverished urban neighborhoods.267 The Met Council broke this
pattern. By 1979, 70% of subsidized housing in the Twin Cities was
constructed in the predominantly White developing communities of
the suburbs—a record of integrated housing placement that has
never been equaled in any major metropolitan area.268

260. See Orfield & Stancil, supra note 258, at 27–28.
261. Id. at 10.
262. Id.
263. See Fiscal Disparities, METRO. COUNCIL, https://metrocouncil.org/
Communities/Planning/Local-Planning-Assistance/Fiscal-Disparities.aspx
[https://perma.cc/QX5K-23Y9].
264. See Village of Burnsville v. Onischuk, 222 N.W.2d 523 (Minn. 1974).
265. Orfield & Stancil, supra note 258, at 10.
266. See 42 U.S.C. § 3608; Metro HRA Rental Assistance, METRO. COUNCIL,
https://metrocouncil.org/Housing/Services/Metro-HRA-Rental-Assistance.aspx
[https://perma.cc/BK6T-PHYN].
267. Orfield & Stancil, supra note 258, at 22.
268. Id.
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But the progress did not last. The Council caved under political
pressure from the central cities and housing industry and returned
to old, segregative patterns of development.269 Many of the Met
Council’s pioneering practices were slowly abandoned—at least in
practice, if not in the letter of the law.270 In doing so, the Council
unilaterally limited its own role in housing. Rather than
coordinating housing development activity throughout the region,
it now restricts its work to a handful of comparatively paltry
funding sources over which it exercises direct control, and
participation in a number of public-private “partnerships,” largely
with housing developers.271 Under the Council’s watch, local
governments have abandoned integrative planning with a regional
perspective.272 They have reverted to segregative practices, creating
a region in which exclusionary zoning reigns and lower-income
housing is locked out of many communities.273 While some
communities have taken actions that reduce housing choice, and
others are forced to bear the burden of runaway demographic
transition, the Council has retreated.274
Worse still, the Council’s more recent activities have
promoted, rather than disrupted, the traditional concentrations of
poverty and segregation in the central cities.275 Its own funding
sources have been distributed in a segregative fashion, with a
disproportionately heavy emphasis on the central cities, and its
negotiated housing goals have reduced the obligation of the region’s
Whitest communities to provide affordable housing.276 It has
embedded housing elements into its plans for other metropolitan
systems like transportation—but only to encourage the
development of lower-income housing along transit corridors, which
are located almost exclusively in the central cities and less-affluent
suburbs.277
The fields of housing and planning, once understood as a core
civil rights concern where decisions could impact living patterns for

269. Id. at 37–47.
270. Id.
271. Id. at 47–54.
272. Id.; see also Edward G. Goetz, Karen Chapple & Barbara Lukermann,
Enabling Exclusion: The Retreat from Regional Fair Share Housing in the
Implementation of the Minnesota Land Use Planning Act, 22 J. PLAN. EDUC. & RSCH.
213, 217–18 (2003).
273. See Orfield & Stancil, supra note 258, at 27–30.
274. See id. at 43–44.
275. See id. at 26–27.
276. See id. at 42–44.
277. Id. at 48–49.

38

Law & Inequality

[Vol. 40: 1

decades, are now dominated by parochial development interests
and neighborhood activists. These include representatives from
affluent and exclusionary suburbs, but also organizations working
in the poorest quarters of the Twin Cities metropolitan area, where
housing policy is dominated by the interest of nonprofit and public
institutions that rely on the segregated status quo.278
A. The Met Council’s Broad Authority to Seek Housing
Integration
Just as riots throughout the country in the late 1960s led to
the Kerner Commission Report and ultimately to the passage of the
Fair Housing Act, serious civil disturbances in North Minneapolis
and growing racial segregation in both central cities’ school systems
were driving forces behind the Council’s fair share housing policy.279
The Council believed that racial segregation was destroying the
education and economic prospects of Black citizens in North
Minneapolis, the fabric and vitality of their neighborhoods, and that
growing racial and social segregation, left unchecked, would harm
the economic vitality of the entire metropolitan area.
In the mid-1970s, the Council sought to establish a staged
growth land planning system. It hired the renowned land use
scholar, Robert Freilich, to design a new Metropolitan Land
Planning Act for submission to the Minnesota legislature.280 From
the outset it was clear the Act would contain a “fair share” housing
requirement, for Freilich believed that the staged growth system
the Council wanted would be unconstitutional without it.281 In
January of 1974, Freilich produced a report to the Met Council
outlining the proposed act and its fair share provisions.282
Freilich grounded his “fair share” proposals in explicit goals
already annunciated by the Council, the requirements of the
278. Id. at 3.
279. Cf. id. at 21–22 (discussing implementation of the fair share goal and citing
integration as a key motivating factor).
280. Robert H. Freilich & John W. Ragsdale, Jr., Timing and Sequential
Controls—The Essential Basis for Effective Regional Planning: An Analysis of the
New Directions for Land Use Control in the Minneapolis-St. Paul Metropolitan
Region, 58 MINN. L. REV. 1009, 1009 n.1 (1974) (“This Article is the result of a 197273 grant from the Twin Cities Metropolitan Council to Professor Freilich to study
and recommend a legal policy for regional growth in accordance with the Council’s
decision to pursue growth in a timed and sequential manner.”).
281. Id. at 1086 (“Whatever the methods used, the region must make extensive
provision for low-moderate income housing or face the grave danger that a general
regional planning system of growth control will be subject to strict scrutiny and
declared unconstitutional as violating the equal protection of the laws.”).
282. Id. at 1009 n.1.
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Federal Fair Housing Act, and the evolving case law prohibiting
exclusionary zoning.
In its early planning documents, the Council highlights the
importance of housing choice and desegregation. It defines the
“Social Objectives of Physical Planning” to include:
1. To increase choice and opportunity for persons in the
Metropolitan area, particularly people who are in some way
disadvantaged, such as low income, minorities, senior
citizens, etc.
2. To decrease residential segregation by race, class, and
income level. To reduce the concentration of lower income
families and individuals in the older areas of the region and
increase housing choice for lower income persons
throughout the area.283
After having achieved its full authorities under the Minnesota
Land Use Planning Act, the Met Council had at its disposal an
arsenal of powerful tools to shape, guide, and enforce local housing
policies. These tools included the authority to:
• Review local applications for state and federal funding
based on housing performance.284
• Award funds directly under its control on the basis of
housing performance, including:
o Sewer funds
o Park funds
o Transportation funds.
• Suspend state agency plans inconsistent with Council
policies.285
• Suspend local comprehensive plans, which could include
the mandatory housing element, if they do not conform
with systems plans.286
• Embed housing elements into system plans.287
• Suspend any matter of metropolitan significance
undertaken by a local government.288

283. Metro. Council, Discussion Statement on Metropolitan Development Policy 7
(Oct. 1973).
284. MINN. STAT. § 473.171 (2020).
285. See MINN. STAT. § 473.165 (2020).
286. See MINN. STAT. § 473.175 (2020).
287. See MINN. STAT. § 473.146 (2020).
288. MINN. STAT. § 473.173 (2020).
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•

Form collaborative review agreements with state agencies,
including the state housing finance agency.289
• Review housing bonding plans.290
The Council also planned to rely on its suburban integration
efforts to receive supplementary funding from HUD, which offered
special allocations to metropolitan areas operating fair share
housing plans.291 On the basis of its promise to maintain a racially
integrated regional fair housing program, the Council requested,
and received, a 50% supplemental Section 8 allocation from HUD in
both 1976 and 1979—almost twice the allocation received by any
other region. It also received further support when its Areawide
Housing Opportunity Plan, which encompassed its housing
program, was certified for extra funding from HUD in 1976.292
B. The Council Promotes Housing Choice and Integration
In response to clear internal and external directives, the
Council in the early 1970s used its state law powers to adopt and
enforce a series of policies to improve racial and economic
integration. It did so by ensuring that subsidized housing was
produced in suburban communities.
The centerpiece of these was Policy 13—later renamed Policy
39—which, in the words of contemporaneous reports, “stated that
in reviewing requests from a local community for state or federal
grants that priority for such requests would be given based on the
community’s housing performance.”293 This method of prioritization
meant that “applications for parks, sewers, water, highway
construction, open space, aging and criminal justice funds [were]
prioritized according to not only the merits of the application itself,
but also on the community’s plans and performance for providing
housing for low and moderate income persons.”294
In addition, the Metropolitan Land Planning Act, which was
passed in 1976, empowered the Council to create numerical housing
allocations for communities within its jurisdiction.295 It could then
289. MINN. STAT. §§ 473.165, 474.173 (2020).
290. See MINN. STAT. § 473.173 (2020).
291. See, e.g., Letter from John Boland, Chairman of the Metropolitan Council, to
James L. Young, HUD Assistant Secretary for Housing (July 6, 1976).
292. BERKELEY PLAN. ASSOCS., ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT OF THE HOUSING
OPPORTUNITY PLAN (AHOP) PROGRAM III-7 (1979).
293. TRUDY PARISA MCFALL, A REGIONAL HOUSING STRATEGY: FROM PLANS TO
IMPLEMENTATION 8 (1975).
294. Id.
295. See MINN. STAT. § 473.859 subd. 2(c) (2020) (“A land use plan shall also
include a housing element containing standards, plans and programs for providing
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review local comprehensive plans to ensure that they were in
compliance with allocated goals.296 The Council was granted the
authority to temporarily suspend plans that did not comply with its
systems plans;297 these systems plans complemented and
incorporated the housing allocations through the use of density
goals and similar measures of housing performance.298
These policies were remarkably successful at promoting fair
housing; over the course of the 1970s the geographic distribution of
subsidized housing in the Twin Cities changed dramatically. In
1970, 90% of Twin Cities subsidized housing was located in the
central cities; by 1979, nearly 40% of units were in suburban
communities.299 In some of the intervening years, the proportion of
new units built in the suburbs approached or exceeded 70% of the
regional total.300 Likewise, while only 16 of the region’s 189
municipalities contained any subsidized housing at all in 1970, that
number had grown to 97 by the end of the decade.301 In under a
decade, the total number of units in the suburbs increased nearly
eight-fold, from 1,878 in 1971 to 14,712 in 1979.302 Nine thousand
four hundred, or 70%, of the over 13,000 units added in this period
were located at the developing edge of the suburbs.303 An
examination of the comprehensive plans of twenty-five sample
communities shortly after the passage of the Metropolitan Land
Planning Act found that over 7,463 parcels of land, totaling 8,590
acres, had been set aside for high density affordable housing.304 In
short, through dedicated effort, the Metropolitan Council

adequate housing opportunities to meet existing and projected local and regional
housing needs, including but not limited to the use of official controls and land use
planning to promote the availability of land for the development of low and moderate
income housing.”).
296. MINN. STAT. § 473.858 subd. 1 (2020).
297. See MINN. STAT. § 473.175 (2020).
298. See MINN. STAT. § 473.859 subd. 1 (2020).
299. Orfield & Stancil, supra note 258, at 22–23.
300. Id. at 22.
301. Id. at 22–23.
302. See METRO. COUNCIL, HOUSING OPPORTUNITY IN THE TWIN CITIES: A STAFF
BACKGROUND REPORT ON THE LOCAL AND REGIONAL RESPONSE 1967-1978, at 3
(1978) [hereinafter STAFF BACKGROUND REPORT].
303. Id.; INST. ON METRO. OPPORTUNITY, COMMENTS ON SECOND DRAFT FAIR
HOUSING EQUITY ASSESSMENT 28–29 (Feb. 28, 2014) [hereinafter SECOND DRAFT
COMMENTS].
304. Edward G. Goetz, Karen Chapple & Barbra Lukermann, The Minnesota
Land Use Planning Act and the Promotion of Low- and Moderate-Income Housing in
Suburbia, 22 LAW & INEQ. 31, 40 (2004); SECOND DRAFT COMMENTS, supra note 303,
at 28.
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substantially and meaningfully opened many of the suburbs to
lower income families.
Writing in 1975, the manager of the Council’s housing
program noted that “[t]he most pervasive characteristic of housing
patterns in virtually all major metropolitan areas is that of
socioeconomic and racial residential segregation.”305 In light of this
fact, “[t]he Council has been chiefly concerned with locating
subsidized housing in well serviced suburban locations.”306 Council
documents rigorously tracked progress towards altering the
distribution of subsidized housing between the suburbs and central
cities; for example, the table below, reproduced from a Council
housing report, depicts the rapid suburbanization of subsidized
units.307

305. MCFALL, supra note 293, at 1–2.
306. Id. at 4.
307. SECOND DRAFT COMMENTS, supra note 303, at 30.
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Remarkably, documents from the period indicate that the
Council confronted, overcame, and eventually transformed political
resistance to integration in the suburbs. At the outset, suburban
communities were skeptical of the Council’s housing policies—for
instance, one staff report describes initial reactions “of anger,
hostility, and frustration” from suburbanites.308 But the agency
remained dedicated to the principle of providing housing choice and
opportunity, noting in the same report that “the available evidence
strongly suggests that minority populations would like a far broader
opportunity for suburban and rural living than they presently

308. METRO. COUNCIL, STAFF BACKGROUND REPORT, supra note 302, at 2.
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have.”309 Moreover, the Council defended its authority to pursue
that outcome, noting that its “review role [for funding] is an
invaluable tool for implementing policy.”310
Ultimately, the Council’s determination paid off, and a
number of the suburbs accepted or even embraced the goals of
suburban integration. For instance, a 1979 report on the region’s
housing policy describes the extraordinary efforts of Edina, one of
the region’s wealthiest suburbs, to comply with its housing
requirements (efforts which were undermined by HUD itself):
The most extreme case we heard of was Edina’s valiant effort
to use one of its last remaining parcels (on its boundary) for
family subsidized housing. It used CDBG funds for land writedowns, held developers’ hands, got city council approval, and
submitted the proposal (demand by the Metro Council’s
allocation plan) to HUD, which turned down the project on the
grounds of “impaction of family housing” although Edina, the
most affluent suburb in the metropolis, had only one other
subsidized family project, and the proposed density was only
nine units per acre. The Edina planner fears . . . the city will be
left out of compliance with the regional plan.311

The same report describes many successful instances of
cooperation with suburban communities to produce subsidized and
lower-income housing.312
C. Retreat and Reversal
Today, as the result of a combination of political timidity and
capitulation to special interests, the Council has unraveled
virtually all of its previous progress towards housing integration.

309.
310.
311.
312.

Id.
Id.
BERKELEY PLAN. ASSOCS., supra note 292.
Id.

2022]

NEO-SEGREGATION IN MINNESOTA

45

After the 1970s, the Council’s efforts to integrate subsidized
and affordable housing into the suburbs began to stagnate. The
suburban share of subsidized housing reached approximately 42%
in the mid-1980s and has not significantly changed since.313
Meanwhile, as sprawl has progressed and the region has grown, the
central cities’ share of regional population has continually
shrunk.314 As a result, the oversupply of subsidized housing in the
central cities, as compared to their proportion of population, has
worsened continually since 1980. Today, the mismatch between
share of population and share of housing in the central cities is
actually far worse than it was before the Council’s integration
efforts began in earnest in 1970 (see the chart below).315

Central Cities’ Disproportionate Share
of Subsidized Housing, 1970–2015

The causes of this reversal are complex, but two factors have
played a key role. First, political actors, particularly housing
interests and central city governmental agencies, have battled to
retain housing funding. Second, there have been marked policy

313. Orfield & Stancil, supra note 258, at 22–23.
314. Greta Kaul, Minneapolis Is Growing at its Fastest Rate Since 1950,
MinnPost
(May
23,
2018),
https://www.minnpost.com/politicspolicy/2018/05/minneapolis-growing-its-fastest-rate-1950/ [https://perma.cc/6ZM4UJGU].
315. Data obtained from Orfield & Stancil, supra note 258, at 6.
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changes at the Council itself, which has deemphasized the very
housing policies it once strictly enforced.
Concern among central city political circles and development
interests about the loss of funding is readily apparent in the
historical documentary record. As early as 1975, the manager of the
Council’s housing program was reporting pushback arising out of
worries over funding:
The major issue which has arisen around the allocation plan
has been the number of units which have been allocated to the
center cities of Minneapolis and St. Paul; the plan directs that
they should receive 16 and 12 percent of the available funding.
City officials have argued that this is inadequate to meet their
needs, slows their urban renewal efforts, and inadequately
provides for relocation needs. The Council has, however,
remained firm in its intention to carry out its plan to increase
the supply of low income housing in suburban areas.
That center city resistance should be the major issue
surrounding the plan was surprising to us, but it certainly is
understandable. Large and sophisticated housing authorities
exist in the cities. . . . They have further relied heavily on
subsidized housing to turn over the land cleared through urban
renewal. Reduction of their programs through redirection of
subsidy
funds
causes
considerable
problems
and
adjustments.316

Although this report was released before the passage of the
Metropolitan Land Planning Act and subsequent creation of a
numerical fair share plan, a 1979 report, commissioned by HUD to
evaluate the region’s areawide housing plan, makes clear that
resistance continued and stiffened over time, resulting in demands
for a higher housing allocation from the central cities. For instance,
one section describes the political relationship between cities and
suburbs:
[T]he very success of the regional housing allocation plan has
generated some discord among the multiple institutions
dedicated to housing . . . . In the plan’s early stages, the central
cities – with 90% of the region’s assisted housing – were eager
for the suburbs to take on some of the burden. Now they feel
dispersion may have gone too far, that central cities need more
of the scarce housing resources.317

The report elaborated further on the pressures on the Council to
abandon its integration efforts:
The pressures to relax the plans aggressive fair share
distribution comes from several sources. Most significantly,
perhaps, the HUD area office . . . . At the same time the central

316. MCFALL, supra note 293, at 12.
317. BERKELEY PLAN. ASSOCS., supra note 292, at III-11.
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cities of Minneapolis and St. Paul are retreating from their
support of the [areawide plan]. St. Paul, the more economically
depressed, had never been as an enthusiastic [plan] supporter
as its Twin City, and is now seeing considerable redevelopment
promoted by an aggressive director of a highly centralized
organization directly under the mayor. In this situation, St.
Paul understandably seeks a larger share of subsidized
housing, citing arguments such as relocation needs,
gentrification, and that the [areawide plan’s] “white flight”
assumption is akin to generals fighting the last war . . . . [B]oth
central cities are looking for larger percentage shares of
subsidized housing in any revisions of the regional allocation
plan.318

The result of these various pressures has been a marked
change in the Council’s priorities, and with it, a failure to enforce
many of its own previous policies. The waning of political will to
maintain the Council’s housing policies is intrinsically linked to the
growth of segregation in the region, as noted in one 2004 study:
Two important changes in the socio-political environment of the
Twin Cities region also undermined the state’s commitment to
fair share housing during the second wave. The first change was
a reduction in gubernatorial support for an interventionist Met
Council. Democrat Rudy Perpich and his successor, Republican
Arne Carlson, both expressed little interest in metropolitan
planning, especially in the area of low-mod housing, and neither
advanced policies to strengthen Met Council. The second
change was a demographic shift in the region. At the same as
more people of color moved to the area, greater concentrations
of poverty and attendant social problems emerged in core
neighborhoods. The social and economic homogeneity that had
been the foundation of almost two decades of regional problemsolving began to disappear. With it went the language of
regional commitment to low-cost housing needs under the fair
share method.319

The same study analyzed the interaction between Council
policies and the comprehensive plans of twenty-five communities.320
It found that, after the Council began aggressively enforcing its
need allocations in the late 70s, “[t]he first round of plans addressed
both the local and regional needs by referencing the fair share
allocation established by Met Council.”321 The influence of the
Council’s policies are clear in the plans themselves, with “[s]ome
plans even indicat[ing] that the regional allocation system was the

318.
319.
320.
321.

Id. at III-4, III-5.
Goetz et al., supra note 304, at 46 (footnotes omitted).
Id. at 40.
Id. at 48.
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best way to determine local needs.”322 These plans “routinely
acknowledge the local regulatory options to overcoming barriers to
low-cost housing development.”323 Once again, suburban
cooperation is a key theme: “the Apple Valley, Inver Grove Heights,
and Eagan plans each contain language stating that housing needs
are best established on a regional basis.”324
But after the Council’s commitment to integration subsided,
cities felt free to ignore the fair share system. According to the
study’s authors, “[n]ot a single plan submitted later than
1990 . . . identified the local share of regional low [and moderate
income] housing needs,” and “[w]ith the exception of two
communities, none of the later plans identified existing or projected
low-mod housing needs at all.”325 Later plans “are generally bereft
of specific statements outlining regulatory steps;”326 for instance, an
Inver Grove Heights plan only states that “[t]o the degree possible,
the City will work to ensure that local actions do not unduly
increase the cost of raw land.”327 The regionally-oriented language
also vanished from the suburban plans, replaced by defiant
assertions of local control:
[I]n its place [was] language asserting each community’s role in
establishing housing goals. The 1999 plan for Apple Valley, for
example, states that “[t]he City is in the best position to
determine the most responsible option for meeting the future
needs of Apple Valley rather than the Metropolitan Council,
especially as it relates to residential densities.”328

The 2004 study determined that these changes reflected a
broader retreat from any consideration whatsoever of low-income
housing in city planning:
Five [cities] indicated that they do not calculate low-mod
housing need in any way. One city planner said her community
does not calculate need because it “is a factor of the marketplace
and changes periodically and regularly with the market.” In
another community, the planner indicated, somewhat
paradoxically, that they do not calculate need because they
have determined that it is zero.329
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.

Id. at 48–49.
Id. at 55.
Id. at 49.
Id. at 48.
Id. at 55.
Id. at 57 (quoting CITY OF INVER GROVE HEIGHTS, INVER GROVE HEIGHTS
COMPREHENSIVE PLAN-DRAFT 7 (1998)).
328. Id. at 49 (third alteration in original) (footnotes omitted) (quoting CITY OF
APPLY VALLEY, COMPREHENSIVE PLAN UPDATE DRAFT 60 (1999)).
329. Id. at 50 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Interview by Leigh Tomlinson with Pam
Dudziak, City Planner, City of Eagan, in Eagan, Minn. (June 29, 2001)) (citing
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The Council’s changing priorities are reflected in its own
reports. As late as 1996, its Regional Blueprint discussed suburban
housing integration, even noting the lack of progress over the
previous decade.330 But by 2004, the Blueprint omitted any
discussion of the subject at all, instead only stating that “[t]he
region will, of course, need much more housing in the next 30 years,”
and emphasizing the importance of “public-private partnerships” in
expanding housing supply.331
These changes are all the more remarkable because the
Council still retains the same authorities it had used to promote
housing integration in previous decades.332 In the mid-1990s, there
were legislative efforts to force the Council to utilize its authorities
more broadly (several of which were directed by Myron Orfield, an
author of this article, who was at the time serving in the state House
of Representatives).333 The legislature twice passed a statute that
would force a return to strong fair-share policies and would require
the council to withhold other forms of financial aid from
noncompliant cities.334 Each bill was vetoed by Governor Arne
Carlson.335
In 1995, a compromise measure, the Livable Communities Act
(LCA), was passed and was signed into law.336 This law did not
contain the clear mandates of the previous effort, instead relying on
voluntary, incentive-based development funding for regional
jurisdictions.337 Although the LCA in no way altered or reduced the
Interview by Jill Mazullo and Mudia Ouzzi with Howard Blin, Plan. Dir., and Stacie
Kvilvang, Econ. Dev. and Hous. Planner, City of Brooklyn Park, in Brooklyn Park,
Minn. (Dec. 11, 2000)).
330. METRO. COUNCIL, REGIONAL BLUEPRINT 59 (1996).
331. METRO. COUNCIL, 2030 REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT FRAMEWORK 13 (2004).
332. See, e.g., Minn. Stat. § 473.175 (2020) (granting the Metropolitan Council the
ability to review comprehensive local plans).
333. See Dane Smith, House Committee Approves Met Council Bill, Members
Would Be Elected Instead of Being Picked by Governor, STAR TRIB., Mar. 25, 1997, at
B3 [hereinafter House Committee] [https://perma.cc/9RFL-JWFL]; Patricia Lopez
Baden, Tax-Sharing Bill Fails in Close Senate Vote, Plan Would Pool Revenues in
Metro Area, STAR TRIB., May 10, 1995, at 1B [https://perma.cc/R9S9-ZR5V]; Dane
Smith, House Again OKs Orfield Housing Bill; Carlson Set to Veto, STAR TRIB., Apr.
23, 1994, at 1B [hereinafter House OKs Orfield] [https://perma.cc/6VE5-LTLA].
334. See House OKs Orfield, supra note 333.
335. See id. (“[T]he bill is almost certain to be vetoed by Gov. Arne Carlson.”);
Baden, supra note 333 (describing Governor Carlson’s opposition to the tax shifting
bill); see also House Committee, supra note 333 (“However, Gov. Arne Carlson is still
opposed to an elected council. Spokesman Brian Dietz said Carlson considers it ‘veto
material.’”).
336. See Metropolitan Livable Communities Act, ch. 255, 1995 Minn. Laws 2592
(codified as Minn. Stat. §§ 473.25–437.255).
337. Goetz et al., supra note 304, at 46–47.
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Council’s previously exercised powers, and was in fact intended to
jumpstart the integrative processes that had been stalled since the
previous decade, it was quickly used to justify the Council’s
changing priorities.338 Suburban leaders argued, incorrectly, that
the Council’s previous legal authority “was superceded [sic] by the
LCA.”339
Once again, the Council’s failure to enforce its policies allowed
exclusionary practices to take root:
Even though LCA benchmarks are low, many communities
negotiate with Met Council to lower their goals even further.
The 1998 plan for Lino Lakes, for example, provides no
calculations of existing or projected need for low-mod housing,
nor the City’s share of the regional need for such housing. The
plan references LCA goals, and notes that the goals for
homeownership are to slightly reduce the rate at which
affordable housing is produced in the City, and to slightly
increase the rate at which affordable rental housing is
developed. Even with the increase in affordable rental housing,
Lino Lakes has adopted a goal that is ten to twenty-three
percentage points below the benchmark provided to them by
Met Council. Oakdale, Shoreview, and Prior Lake have also
adopted goals below the provided benchmarks.340

The lopsided LCA benchmarks have resulted in even-morelopsided funding outcomes.341 Of the more than 14,000 housing
units subsidized by LCA funding during the program’s history,
49.8% have been located in the central cities of Minneapolis and St.
Paul, which contain only 24.7% of the region’s housing and a
majority of its concentrated poverty and segregation.342 Most of
these allocations occurred under the previous set of benchmarks.
But as Table Two demonstrates, when new benchmarks were
negotiated, the Council worked not to arrest this trend, but instead
accelerated it by giving the central cities higher goals.343
It remains unclear to this day exactly when and how the bold
fair share policies of previous decades were eliminated at the Met
Council. The best evidence suggests they were abandoned by
piecemeal nonenforcement in the 1990s, seemingly out of the same
concern over suburban backlash that had resulted in the gutting of
338. See Orfield & Stancil, supra note 258, at 42–43.
339. Goetz et al., supra note 304, at 51 (quoting Interview by Jill Mazullo with
John Heald, Cmty. Dev. Dir., City of Savage, in Savage, Minn. (Nov. 29, 2000)).
340. Id. at 53–54 (footnotes omitted).
341. Data on LCA funding was analyzed by the Institute on Metropolitan
Opportunity at the University of Minnesota. Underlying datasets are on file with
authors.
342. Id.
343. See infra note 361.
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Minnesota’s school desegregation rule.344 Notably, some of the same
figures crop up: Lee Sheehy, the Deputy Attorney General who had
presided over the school rule’s evisceration, became regional
administrator at the Met Council in the early 2000s, where he
oversaw much of the day-to-day operations of the agency.345
In the 2010s, under the Obama administration, the federal
government began to refocus on questions of integration and
segregation. These changes most notably took the form of a raft of
new civil rights rules, including a Discriminatory Effect rule
formalizing the Fair Housing Act’s bar against the perpetuation of
segregation and an Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing Rule
requiring some local jurisdictions to take affirmative steps to create
integrated housing.346
However, the Met Council’s housing policy efforts in the 2010s
continued to reduce the role of integration in the agency’s policies.
In 2010, the Council was awarded a $5 million HUD grant under
the national Sustainable Communities program, a federal effort to
coordinate housing and transit planning.347
As a component of its Sustainable Communities grant, the
Council was required to complete an “equity assessment,”
essentially identifying high-poverty and high-opportunity areas
within the region and analyzing how those policies interacted with
public investment and fair housing issues.348 The Council’s
completed assessment, however, exhibited the influence of its
integration-skeptical consultants and largely minimized the subject
of segregation. Although it identified areas of concentrated poverty
as required by grant terms, it did not articulate any real strategy
for eliminating the segregation in those areas.349 In addition, it
conducted an assessment of neighborhood opportunity that acted as

344. Despite repeated requests, the Met Council has never provided authors or
any other agency documentation of a specific decision to begin nonenforcement of
these policies. See Orfield & Stancil, supra note 258, at 42–44 for additional
discussion.
345. Brady Averill, Klobuchar Picks Sheehy as Her New Chief of Staff, STAR TRIB.,
May 19, 2007, at 11A [https://perma.cc/2MDT-Q8VS].
346. Implementation of the Fair Housing Act’s Discriminatory Effects Standard,
78 Fed. Reg. 11,460 (Feb. 15, 2013) (codified at 24 C.F.R. pt. 100); Affirmatively
Furthering Fair Housing Rule, 80 Fed. Reg. 42,272 (July 16, 2015) (codified at 24
C.F.R. pts. 5, 91, 92, 570, 574, 576, 903).
347. See Twin Cities Metropolitan Sustainable Communities Regional Planning
Program, Application to HUD 2 (August 22, 2010).
348. METRO. COUNCIL, Executive Summary: About this Summary, in CHOICE,
PLACE, AND OPPORTUNITY: AN EQUITY ASSESSMENT OF THE TWIN CITIES REGION, at
III–IV (2014).
349. See id. (explaining criteria for Racially Concentrated Areas of Poverty).
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a virtual apologia for neighborhood segregation. Communities in
the Twin Cities region were classified into opportunity tiers.350 But
rather than array those tiers from high to low, the Council’s equity
assessment identified advantages and disadvantages for each tier,
making them appear in many respects equivalent. For instance,
affluent suburban areas were identified as having “[a]bove average
school performance” but “[l]ow access to social services,” while
segregated central city areas were described as having “[h]igh
access to social services” but “below average school performance.”351
Simultaneously, the Met Council was working on a renewed
Housing Policy Plan for the region, the first formal update of its
housing plan in nearly 30 years.352 The plan it developed, which was
adopted in 2014, echoed the ideas of the equity assessment.353 It
formally eliminated Policy 39 conditioning funding on housing
performance, which had last been articulated in 1985.354
Remarkably, despite the federal efforts to re-center housing
segregation, the new Housing Policy Plan all but ignored the topic.
Indeed, it only mentions the word four times: once describing future
challenges for the region, once in a description of the equity
assessment, and twice in a description of President Obama’s new
affirmatively further rule—which it otherwise ignored.355
The new housing plan updated the regional “housing need”
calculation for every jurisdiction, and also updated LCA
benchmarks for housing construction.356 In the most recent set of
LCA goals, nearly every subset of communities was permitted to
adopt a benchmark far below their allocated regional need—except
the central cities, which were explicitly required to adopt a
benchmark that was 100% of their allocated need. The central cities

350. METRO. COUNCIL, Section Six: Opportunity in the Region, in CHOICE, PLACE,
AND OPPORTUNITY: AN EQUITY ASSESSMENT OF THE TWIN CITIES REGION 2–3 (2014).
(“A second shortcoming of the [Cumulative Opportunity] Index is that it categorizes
communities as either low or high opportunity rather than recognizing each
community’s mix of assets and shortcomings. Consequently, it fails to capture the
multi-dimensional nature of communities without labeling and stigmatizing some
communities as ‘bad’ communities.”).
351. Id. at 5.
352. METRO. COUNCIL, HOUSING POLICY PLAN 1 (2014) [hereinafter HOUSING
POLICY PLAN].
353. See, e.g., id. at 136 (discussing the equity assessment).
354. Id. at 102–03.
355. See id. at 12, 58, 136.
356. See METRO. COUNCIL, 2021-2030 ALLOCATION OF AFFORDABLE HOUSING
NEED IN THE TWIN CITIES (2014) (listing calculated need).

2022]

NEO-SEGREGATION IN MINNESOTA

53

were the only communities whose LCA benchmarks actually
increased in relation to the previous round (see the figure below).357

At every stage of the Met Council’s policymaking process, civil
rights advocates, including the authors of this article, attempted to
draw attention to its missteps. In lengthy comments submitted on
drafts of both the Equity Assessment and the Housing Policy Plan
(as well as an amendment to the Housing Policy Plan in 2015),
commenters drew attention to the reduced role of segregation in
Council policy.358 This omission, commenters argued, was both
inadvisable as a matter of regional policy, and likely violative of
federal civil rights law.359 Nonetheless, these frustrations fell on
357. Calculations performed by the Institute on Metropolitan Opportunity.
358. See INST. ON METRO. OPPORTUNITY, COMMENTS ON THE METRO. COUNCIL
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE HOUSING POLICY PLAN 1 (2015) [hereinafter
COMMENTS ON AMENDMENTS].
359. SECOND DRAFT COMMENTS, supra note 303, at 7 (“The Met Council ignores
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deaf ears and no significant revisions were made as a result of civil
rights concerns.360
D. Neo-Segregation in Twin Cities Housing Policy
The abandonment of the Met Council’s historic emphasis on
coordinated regional planning has resulted in the atomization of
housing policy in the Twin Cities region. Individual developers or
cities compete for housing resources, often seeking the path of least
resistance to acquire and utilize those resources.361 Because of the
long historical links between affordable development in non-White
segregated neighborhoods, and the relative lack of affluent White
exclusionary political forces in those areas, the path of least
resistance is typically to concentrate affordable housing in those
areas, further deepening segregation.362
In a process that mirrors the charter school system’s eventual
embrace of segregation, the entities that dominate modern
affordable housing development have come to advocate against
racial integration.363 Thus the Twin Cities have developed a
complex stakeholder group with direct interests in promoting the
continuation of the status quo of residential segregation—in short,
housing neo-segregationists.
Early manifestations of this approach appeared in
government, as Minneapolis and St. Paul developed policy
mechanisms to recapture housing money that was being allocated
to suburban areas.364 In 1980, the cities jointly created the Family
Housing Fund, a “quasi-public” entity designed to help generate and
allocate funding for central city housing projects.365 In its first
decade of existence, the Family Housing Fund reported that it had
created approximately 10,500 units of affordable housing in the
central cities.366
The Family Housing Fund still exists today, helping to produce
hundreds of housing units annually, which are more likely to be
the implications of the education data, even though it is clearly part of their duty
under the Fair Housing Act and even though all of the FHEA material and webinars
state this analysis of school segregation must be part of the FHEA.”); COMMENTS ON
AMENDMENTS, supra note 358, at 2 (“Federal law requires that the Council’s policies
actively promote the racial integration of housing.”).
360. See HOUSING POLICY PLAN, supra note 352.
361. See Orfield & Stancil, supra note 258, at 23–24.
362. Id. at 4.
363. Id. at 26–27.
364. Id. at 3.
365. Id. at 3, 24.
366. Id. at 24.

2022]

NEO-SEGREGATION IN MINNESOTA

55

located in segregated census tracts than regional subsidized
housing as a whole.367 It has, in the interim, spun off a number of
subordinate organizations, such as the Twin Cities Community
Land Bank and Twin Cities Housing Development Corporation,
which have also at times have been described as quasi-public but
now operate more or less independently.368
Efforts to return housing subsidies to the central cities were
assisted by the implementation, in 1987, of the Low-Income
Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) system. Prior to LIHTC, most federal
housing subsidies were managed by HUD, an agency with a strong
statutory civil rights mandate and a civil rights division.369 But in
the second half of the 20th century, the amount of federal funding
directed to public housing and these other subsidies rapidly
declined—ironically, partly as a result of the concern that public
housing was being constructed in a segregative fashion.370 In 1986,
the Reagan administration created a broad new tax credit for use
constructing subsidized housing.371 This tax credit is now the
federal government’s primary contribution to subsidized housing
construction, which has effectively privatized the affordable
housing industry and placed it under the management of the
Internal Revenue Service, a department with no civil rights
expertise.372
The advent of the LIHTC system muddled many of the
avenues of control that the Met Council and other agencies had over
housing siting. LIHTC projects are initially proposed by a
developer—usually private—and agencies primarily exercise
control over development with allocation criteria that incentivize
certain types of proposals. As a result, subsidized units are more
likely to be focused in areas where affordable housing developers
are already experienced and active—primarily areas that are lowincome and racially segregated.373 Coordinated regional policy is
much more difficult when responsibility for individual projects lies
367. Myron Orfield, Will Stancil, Thomas Luce & Eric Myott, Response to PovertyPimping CDCs: The Search for Dispersal’s Next Bogeyman, 25 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE
619, 627 (2015).
368. Orfield & Stancil, supra note 258, at 26.
369. Id. at 27.
370. Doug Gustafson, Short History of Public Housing in the US (1930’s – Present),
HOMES NOW (Apr. 3, 2018), https://homesnow.org/short-history-of-public-housing-inthe-us-1930s-present/ [https://perma.cc/UV3A-SW5E].
371. CORIANNE PAYTON SCALLY, AMANDA GOLD & NICOLE DUBOIS, URB. INST.,
THE LOW-INCOME HOUSING TAX CREDIT: HOW IT WORKS AND WHO IT SERVES 1
(2018).
372. See id.
373. Orfield & Stancil, supra note 258, at 3.

56

Law & Inequality

[Vol. 40: 1

with a dense cluster of individual private actors.374 And while
housing funding agencies may give preference to projects that are
integrative, or at least, not segregative, they will likely face
pushback from the developers that are primary clients and may
resent any effort to make subsidies harder to obtain.375 When
lobbied by civil rights advocates to make their LIHTC allocation
policies more integrative, or remove overtly segregative criteria, the
Minnesota Housing Agency has responded reluctantly.376
In the Twin Cities, central city development interests went a
step further to secure tax credit funding. As pressure to restore
subsidies to the cities of Minneapolis and St. Paul mounted, the
state legislature implemented a novel “suballocator” system.377 The
suballocator system gives Minneapolis and St. Paul independent
control of a separate pool of tax credits, while the state housing
agency manages tax credit awards for most of the rest of the state,
including most Twin Cities suburbs.378 As a result, the cities can
protect their tax credits from suburban competition and set
independent allocative criteria for that funding.379 Notably, the
share of tax credits assigned to the central city was set at the time
of the system’s implementation in 1987, and remained unchanged
for many years, even while the cities’ share of metropolitan
population dropped.380 The allocative system produced by the
Council granted 35.6% of metropolitan tax credits to the
Minneapolis and St. Paul suballocators, far greater than these
cities’ share of the regional population.381 This share acts as an
effective minimum allocation, but the cities are also eligible for

374. See, e.g., id. at 50–51.
375. Id. at 31.
376. Myron Orfield, Will Stancil, Thomas Luce & Eric Myott, High Costs and
Segregation in Subsidized Housing Policy, 25 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 574, 592 (2015)
[hereinafter Orfield et al., High Costs].
377. Id. at 577.
378. Id. (noting that several suburban counties such as Dakota and Washington
Counties and several non-metro cities are also suballocators); see also id. at 594
(explaining that suburbs receive relatively small pools of tax credits; the primary
divide remains between the two central cities and the state housing agency).
379. Id. at 594 (“Another important consideration is the way in which the
allocation process shields geographic shares of LIHTC funding from competitive
pressure. The suballocator system ensures that the vast majority of central city
allocations cannot be diverted to the suburbs, no matter how much cheaper it is to
pursue suburban development.”).
380. After the state housing agency and Met Council faced a HUD fair housing
complaint in 2015, the suballocator shares were finally adjusted to more closely align
with population share. See MINN. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, AMENDED 2014/2015 HOUSING
TAX CREDIT PROGRAM PROCEDURAL MANUAL (2015).
381. Orfield et al., High Costs, supra note 376, at 597.
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additional credits, allocated by the state housing finance agency.382
Between 2006 and 2016, the cities received an average of 45% of the
regional allocation annually, and in some years, more than half the
regional allocation.383
The privatization and fragmentation of housing subsidy
streams, as well as the new, central-city driven policy consensus on
affordable housing development has helped feed the growth of a
vast network of nonprofit corporations, housing-oriented financial
institutions,
public-private
collaboratives,
housing-centric
foundation work, and other small-bore efforts.384
This constellation of housing developers and other housingrelated firms has created a welter of problems for Minnesota.
Among the most severe of these is the seemingly irrepressible
growth of affordable housing costs. There are limited cost controls
on affordable housing development, and developers earn fees on a
percentage-of-total-cost basis, creating a perverse incentive to drive
costs up rather than minimize them. Perhaps relatedly, affordable
development costs have skyrocketed. In recent years, it is not
unusual for affordable housing projects to exceed $300,000,
$400,000, and $500,000 per unit.385 Tellingly, these per-unit costs
are actually lower in suburban areas, despite suburban projects
tending to include larger units.386 Development costs tend to be
higher in central cities, where projects are more likely to be
managed by private nonprofit developers and include novel
subsidies from many sources.387 Tax credit projects also tend to have
higher development costs.388
This lack of oversight and centralized coordination has given
root to trends even more troubling than high costs. A recent fad in
Minnesota affordable housing is the growth of ultra-high-cost
subsidized housing projects where residents are predominantly
White.389 Rather suspiciously, given the demographics of their
residents, these buildings also tend to bill themselves as “artist
housing,” which, under an obscure 2008 federal exemption, allows

382.
383.
384.
385.
386.
387.
388.
389.

Id.
Calculated from data provided by the Minnesota Housing Finance Agency.
Orfield et al., High Costs, supra note 376, at 589.
Data provided by Minnesota Housing Finance Agency.
Orfield et al., High Costs, supra note 376, at 584.
Id.
Id. at 583–88.
INST. ON METRO. OPPORTUNITY, THE RISE OF WHITE-SEGREGATED
SUBSIDIZED HOUSING 1 (2016) [hereinafter WHITE-SEGREGATED SUBSIDIZED
HOUSING].
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building managers to pre-screen residents.390 Often, these buildings
are located in up-and-coming neighborhoods and have spectacular
amenities, like gyms, yoga studios, and rooftop bars.391 One
developer, Dominium, has made such projects a major part of its
housing portfolio.392 It has produced several of the highest-cost
projects in Minnesota, all of which are part of this trend.393 This
included a $170 million rehab of a historic Pillsbury A-Mill into a
soaring housing complex on the Minneapolis riverfront.394 Units in
the A-Mill averaged $665,000 each—mostly for studio or onebedroom apartments, albeit with fifteen-foot ceilings and sweeping
views of downtown Minneapolis.395
The dense web of affordable developers has become a political
actor in its own right. The number of entities involved in affordable
housing development (the Twin Cities alone contains dozens of
community development corporations) and the complexity of their
joint efforts (a single housing project can involve the participation
of close to a dozen different for-profit and non-profit partners)
makes it impossible to fully trace industry influence on housing
policy.396 But there is no shortage of examples. The artist screening
exemption mentioned above was added by the U.S. Congress after
lobbying by a Minnesota-based affordable housing company.397 And
they have not hesitated to protect their ability to develop where and
when they want. After Dominium came under scrutiny for its work
on yet another nine-figure rehab, it sought—and received—a
change to Minnesota law which forbade the state housing agency
from considering high costs when determining whether to fund the
project.398 Dominium is also the highest contributor to a PAC—the
Multi Housing Political Action Committee—representing
developers in Minnesota state politics.399

390. Id.
391. Id. at 3.
392. Id. at 32.
393. Id. at 1.
394. Id. at 17.
395. Id. at 4.
396. E.g., Orfield et al., High Costs, supra note 376, at 601–02 (describing the
Franklin-Portland project’s complex mix of funding sources).
397. WHITE-SEGREGATED SUBSIDIZED HOUSING, supra note 389, at 5.
398. See, e.g., J. Patrick Coolican, Legislature Pushes Fort Snelling Affordable
Housing, at $600k per Unit, STAR TRIB. (May 25, 2018), https://www.startribune.com/
legislature-pushes-fort-snelling-affordable-housing-at-600k-per-unit/483632651/
[https://perma.cc/NP52-87BG].
399. Search Contributors, MINN. CAMPAIGN FIN. BD., https://cfb.mn.gov/reports/#/
contributors/ [https://perma.cc/NJA7-YLZ3].
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Moreover, the largest entities sometimes partner directly with
government bodies like the Met Council to coordinate housing and
development choices. For instance, the Met Council and the
aforementioned Family Housing Fund participated as leading
partners on several local development coalitions, including the
ostensibly-public Corridors of Opportunity program (funded by the
2010 Sustainable Communities grant and intended for development
along urban transit corridors) and the ostensibly-private Central
Corridor Funders’ Collaborative (to promote development along the
Green Line transit corridor through Minneapolis and St. Paul).400
Both initiatives focused heavily on central-city housing
development in high-frequency transit areas, ultimately driving
greater urban subsidized housing development at the expense of
projects in affluent, high-opportunity suburbs.401 Other frequent
partners included the Local Initiatives Support Corporation (or
LISC), a national affordable housing financial institution designed
to facilitate funding streams to subsidized projects.402 LISC is so
heavily connected to 1990s Democratic Leadership Conference neoliberalism that its 20-year board chair is Clinton Secretary of the
Treasury Robert Rubin, infamous for his role promoting subprime
lending.403 The organization participated in most major Twin Cities
affordable housing policymaking of the previous decade, including
both of the initiatives above.
Locally, developers have consolidated their efforts behind
various entities, such as the Metropolitan Consortium of
Community Developers.404 They have also funded local nonprofits
to support their efforts. For instance, developers have heavily

400. METRO. COUNCIL, CORRIDORS OF OPPORTUNITY, FINAL NARRATIVE REPORT 28
(2014) [hereinafter FINAL NARRATIVE REPORT] (listing Elizabeth Ryan of Family
Housing Fund as a partner); see generally CENTRAL CORRIDOR FUNDERS
COLLABORATIVE, THE FINAL REPORT (2016) (explaining the Metropolitan Council’s
involvement as the designer/builder of the Green Line).
401. E.g., FINAL NARRATIVE REPORT, supra note 400, at 16–17 (describing site
specific projects and pre-development projects, most of which are located in the
central-city); see generally CENTRAL CORRIDOR FUNDERS COLLABORATIVE, supra note
400 (discussing affordable housing plans along the Central Corridor, a location in
the city-center of the Twin Cities).
402. See FINAL NARRATIVE REPORT, supra note 400, at 17.
403. See Board of Directors, LOCAL INITIATIVES SUPPORT CORP.,
https://www.lisc.org/about-us/board-of-directors/ [https://perma.cc/W2J6-CU4F].
404. Orfield et al., High Costs, supra note 376, at 589 (“There is no truly ‘typical’
organization. Instead, the industry is composed of many heterogeneous firms. At
present, the Metropolitan Consortium of Community Developers (MCCD), which
includes almost all the major players in the Twin Cities housing nonprofit scene, has
49 members, which range from tiny community groups to large nonprofits with
yearly revenues in the tens of millions of dollars.”).
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supported the Minnesota Housing Partnership. The organization
blurs the line between lobbying and policy research, with its mission
including “[p]rovid[ing] original research and education resources
to generate public support of vital communities and affordable
housing,” and “[d]riv[ing] efforts to secure the policies and funding
needed at the regional, state, and federal levels to advance local
housing and community development.”405 The organization’s board
is primarily composed of the presidents of development companies,
but also includes the housing and development directors from
Minneapolis and St. Paul.406 For many years, the president of the
A-Mill developer Dominium served as chair of this organization.407
The partnership’s research never touches core civil rights questions
like segregation in housing but reliably emphasizes the need for
more funding to combat shortages and gentrification.408
This nonprofit industrial complex has helped spur the rise of a
coterie of integration-skeptical academics, advocates, and
attorneys. For example, a frequent partner of major Twin Cities
housing nonprofits is the prominent Center for Urban and Regional
Affairs at the University of Minnesota. The director of that
institute, Edward Goetz, has positioned himself as a strong critic of
housing integration policy for decades.409 Goetz has consistently
maintained that the Fair Housing Act was not intended to include
an integration mandate and that “the language of the act itself is
unambiguously focused on eliminating private discrimination in the
private housing market.”410 In recent years, he has published a
book-length refutation of the idea that integration is a core aim of
the Fair Housing Act or should be a major goal of housing policy.411
His claims about the Act, in addition to contradicting every

405. See Who We Are, MINN. HOUS. P’SHIP, https://www.mhponline.org/about
[https://perma.cc/PWB9-DGZR] [hereinafter Who We Are].
406. See Board, MINN. HOUS. P’SHIP, http://www.mhponline.org/about/board
[https://perma.cc/7VTS-49ZQ] [hereinafter Minn. Hous. P’ship Board].
407. See id.
408. See, e.g., MINN. HOUS. P’SHIP, SOLD OUT (2016) (emphasizing increasing sales
of rental property in the Twin Cities driving up rents).
409. See, e.g., Edward Goetz, Poverty-Pimping CDCs: The Search for Dispersal’s
Next Bogeyman, 25 HOUS. POL’Y DEBATE 608, 610 (2015) (“Given these counter
claims on housing policy, is there any evidence for the proposition that integration
is a privileged objective of federal housing policy? Certainly not in the Fair Housing
Act itself.”).
410. EDWARD GOETZ, THE ONE-WAY STREET OF INTEGRATION: FAIR HOUSING AND
THE PURSUIT OF RACIAL JUSTICE 96 (2018).
411. See id.
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Supreme Court and Circuit Court interpretation to date, have been
directly refuted by Walter Mondale, a co-author of the Act.412
This network of experts has played an important role in
establishing a theoretical and academic framework for many of the
neo-segregationist policies adopted by Minnesota governments and
agencies. Most national research has shown clear benefits of
integration in housing and schools, like the 2015 study by Harvard
professor Raj Chetty that unambiguously showed that moving to
affluent areas produced adult income benefits for low-income
children.413 But Minnesota agencies have typically preferred to rely
on local experts and advocates instead, many of whom could be
relied upon to produce dissenting, integration-skeptical work.
For example, in the wake of a civil rights lawsuit requiring the
Minneapolis Public Housing Authority to stop segregatively
concentrating its public housing units in heavily-Black North
Minneapolis, the Family Housing Fund and the Minnesota state
housing agency hired Goetz to produce a lengthy evaluative
report.414 Unsurprisingly, the resulting document suggested the
lawsuit was ultimately unhelpful and argued that preserving
community links was more important than attacking residential
segregation.415 In similar fashion, as a component of its 2010
Sustainable Communities grant, the Met Council also hired a team
of Minnesota-based private and academic consultants to conduct
evaluation.416 That team included Goetz.417 It also included Jack
Cann, a housing attorney who frequently represented subsidized
developers, and has opposed policies that require integrative
placement of affordable units, describing Met Council fair-share
412. Walter F. Mondale, The Civil Rights Law We Ignored, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 10,
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/10/opinion/walter-mondale-fair-housingact.html [https://perma.cc/9DJA-ALTG] (“At times, critics suggest the law’s
integration aims should be sidelined in favor of colorblind enforcement measures
that stamp out racial discrimination but do not serve the larger purpose of defeating
systemic segregation. To the law’s drafters, these ideas were not in conflict.”).
413. See Raj Chetty, Nathaniel Hendren & Lawrence F. Katz, The Effects of
Exposure to Better Neighborhoods on Children: New Evidence from the Moving to
Opportunity Experiment, 106 AM. ECON. REV. 855 (2016).
414. See EDWARD G. GOETZ, CTR. FOR URB. AND REG’L AFF., U. OF MINN.,
DECONCENTRATING POVERTY IN MINNEAPOLIS: HOLLMAN V. CISNEROS ix (2002)
(thanking the Family Housing Fund and the Minnesota Housing Finance Agency for
funding the research).
415. Id. at 16–21.
416. U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV., FY2010 SUSTAINABLE COMMUNITIES
REGIONAL PLANNING GRANT PROGRAM – GRANTEES 1 (2010).
417. Edward G. Goetz, Curriculum Vitae, HUMPHREY SCH. PUB. AFFS.,
https://www.hhh.umn.edu/sites/hhh.umn.edu/files/2020-08/Goetz,%20Edward%20
CV.pdf [https://perma.cc/NT39-YMT8].
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policies as “dispersal” as early as 1973.418 Another member of
Goetz’s Center sits on the board of the aforementioned Minnesota
Housing Partnership.419
Although the Met Council remains the regional governmental
entity primarily responsible for civil rights backsliding, other local
governments, particularly in the central cities of Minneapolis and
St. Paul, have undergone similar reversions under pressure from
development interests. For example, in 2012, Minneapolis adopted
a Consolidated Plan that weakened a previous bar on the use of
HUD HOME funds to build affordable housing in racially
identifiable neighborhoods.420
Declining concern about segregation is also evident in other
government processes. Jurisdictions receiving HUD funding also
are required to submit a five-year report called an Analysis of
Impediments to Fair Housing (AI).421 Similar to the Met Council
equity assessment discussed above, these reports require
jurisdictions to identify demographic patterns, as well as obstacles
to fair housing opportunity, including patterns of integration and
segregation.422 In the Twin Cities region, the 13 HUD entitlement
jurisdictions, which include Minneapolis, St. Paul, several large
suburbs, and several counties, have coordinated their AI process,
releasing a single “regional” AI that covers all communities.423
Two such AIs have been completed in the past decade: one in
2020 and one in 2014.424 The latter entirely ignored the question of
how racial segregation plays out in Minnesota.425 Although federal
policy requires AI jurisdictions to identify public policies that have
created fair housing obstacles, both AIs spared the jurisdictions
themselves from critique and focused heavily on private-market
factors that obstructed housing opportunity.426 Indeed, the 2014 AI
avoided the word segregation altogether, except two brief
summaries of third-party reports, a web survey response, and once
418. See Low Income Housing Dispersal, MINNEAPOLIS STAR, Jan. 2, 1973.
419. Minn. Hous. P’ship Board, supra note 406 (listing Dr. Brittany Lewis, Senior
Research Associate of the Center for Urban and Regional Affairs, as a board
member).
420. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOUS. & URB. DEV., THE FY 2012 MINNEAPOLIS
CONSOLIDATED PLAN FOR HOUSING AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT (2012–2013).
421. Id. at 83.
422. WESTERN ECON. SERV., LLC, FAIR HOUS. IMPLEMENTATION COUNCIL, 2009
ANALYSIS OF IMPEDIMENTS TO FAIR HOUSING CHOICE: FINAL REPORT 1 (2009).
423. See id. at 11; HOUSINGLINK, FAIR HOUSING IMPLEMENTATION COUNCIL, 2014
ANALYSIS OF IMPEDIMENTS TO FAIR HOUSING CHOICE: TWIN CITIES REGION 6 (2015).
424. WESTERN ECON. SERV., LLC, supra note 422; HOUSINGLINK, supra note 423.
425. See HOUSINGLINK, supra note 423.
426. Id. at 43.
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in the preface.427 Although comments were submitted identifying
these and other shortcomings, local leaders remained resistant to
changing the documents.428
The growth of neo-segregationist thinking in Twin Cities
housing politics reached a head in the mid-2010s. In 2014 and 2015,
several Minneapolis neighborhood groups, a housing civil rights
group, and three regional suburbs filed two HUD fair housing
complaints.429 The first complaint was filed against the Met Council
and the state housing agency, citing their abandonment of previous
housing integration policies, including the fair-share policy.430 The
second complaint was filed against the central cities of Minneapolis
and St. Paul, citing their longstanding practice of
disproportionately situating new affordable development in lowincome areas.431
The complaints quickly became a flashpoint for housing
politics. Exhibiting their deep skepticism of housing integration,
local housing nonprofits, coordinated through several umbrella
entities (most notably the Metropolitan Consortium of Community
Developers), quickly opposed both complaints.432 Developers
organized letter-writing campaigns, arguing that the complaints
would remove much-needed resources from poor areas, and
attempted to intervene directly with HUD.433
427. See id. at 6, 73, 76, 121.
428. See, e.g., INST. ON METRO. OPPORTUNITY, COMMENTS ON THE DRAFT FHIC
2014 ANALYSIS OF IMPEDIMENTS FOR THE TWIN CITIES REGION (2015).
429. See Sasha Aslanian, Twin Cities Suburbs File Housing Complaint Against
State, MPR NEWS (Nov. 10, 2014), https://www.mprnews.org/story/2014/11/10/
Housing-complaing [https://perma.cc/PCQ5-WLT8]; Peter Callaghan, Settlement
Could Alter How Affordable Housing Is Built Throughout Twin Cities Metro,
MINNPOST (May 13, 2016), https://www.minnpost.com/politics-policy/2016/05/
settlement-could-alter-how-affordable-housing-built-throughout-twin-cities-m/
[https://perma.cc/XFE2-7YZ7].
430. See MICAH Fair Housing Complaints to HUD, METRO. INTERFAITH COAL. ON
AFFORDABLE HOUS., https://www.micah.org/hud-complaint [https://perma.cc/9873TCKS] [hereinafter MICAH Complaints].
431. See id.; see also Peter Callaghan, Civil Rights Complaint Seeks to Stop Cities
from Concentrating Low-Income Housing in High-Poverty Neighborhoods,
MINNPOST (Apr. 14, 2015), https://www.minnpost.com/politics-policy/2015/04/civilrights-complaint-seeks-stop-cities-concentrating-low-income-housing-hi/
[https://perma.cc/6E7W-RESY].
432. This opposition was primarily registered in materials distributed through
the community. For example, one letter authored by the Consortium, on file with
authors, claimed that the complaints were “[t]hwarting Business and Housing
Opportunities” and focused heavily on how they would prevent additional housing
funding in central city neighborhoods.
433. At a community meeting, the developer Urban Homeworks distributed
postcards opposing the complaint, pre-addressed to HUD. A copy of this postcard is
on file with the authors.
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The second complaint, filed against Minneapolis and St. Paul,
reached an ambiguous conclusion in 2016.434 Both cities entered
into Voluntary Compliance Agreements with HUD, agreeing to take
certain measures to improve their housing policies.435 Chief among
these was a revision of the 2016 Analysis of Impediments. In what
represented a tacit admission of the deficiencies of the 2016
submission, the revised document would be constructed by a Fair
Housing Advisory Committee, and was required to include a
renewed focus on integration, segregation, and public policies
contributing to fair housing impediments.436
However, the Fair Housing Advisory Committee process
envisioned in the compliance agreements was complex and
contentious. The committees included both the original
complainants, as well as the city respondents.437 But after
substantial lobbying by housing developers, a contingent of
developer-friendly nonprofits—as well as several subsidized
housing developers—were also awarded seats on the committee.438
These nonprofit members argued vociferously against inclusion of
any material that would suggest that integration was a major
objective of housing policy, and suggested that integration be
defined more nebulously to include areas that were non-White
segregated.439 The developers and nonprofit also argued that the
434. See MICAH Complaints, supra note 430 (“HUD announced agreements with
the City of Minneapolis and the City of St. Paul to further housing choice and
neighborhood opportunities in the two cities and the surrounding region.”).
435. See Voluntary Compliance Agreement Between the U.S. Dep’t of Hous. and
Urb. Dev., the City of Minneapolis, the Metro. Interfaith Council on Affordable
Hous., the Webber-Camden Neighborhood Org., the Whittier All., and the Folwell
Neighborhood Ass’n (May 16, 2016).
436. Id.
437. Id. at 5.
438. Id.
439. Minutes for the Fair Housing Advisory Committee meetings, on file with the
authors, demonstrate the persistent efforts of developer-affiliated groups to steer the
conversation away from the mandated subject of integration. Taken together, they
form a useful illustration of how neo-segregationist organizations can take
advantage of consensus-driven processes to protect their material interests by
invoking equity and broadmindedness.
• In a June 29, 2016 meeting, a representative from community developer
ACER spoke up to try to reframe the discussion away from segregation and
integration.
• In a July 27, 2016 meeting, the lobbyist for development-oriented groups tries
to argue against the notion of affordable housing concentration, arguing that
too much housing cannot be concentrated in a neighborhood.
• In a September 28, 2016 meeting, the ACER representative spoke up again to
criticize the use of the term integration.
• In the same meeting, the lobbyist speaks up to say he has a fundamental
disagreement with other people at the table about where investment should
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focus of the revised AI should be gentrification and housing
displacement, phenomena which conveniently served as a
justification for the preexisting policy of siting subsidized housing
in low-income areas.
As a result of these efforts, the final revised AI represented
both a substantial improvement over the previous submission, and
a policy mishmash that envisioned relatively minor changes.440
Most of the recommendations in the final revised AI were policies
already adopted, or already under consideration, in the central
cities. Meanwhile, the process was completed in the early months of
the Trump administration, at a time when federal fair housing
enforcement was collapsing.441 As a result, there has been, by all
appearances, little follow-up oversight from federal agencies to
ensure the cities are meeting even their small obligations.
The other HUD complaint, against the Met Council and state
housing agency, was never resolved. Little progress was made after
administrations changed in 2017. It remains to be seen how the
matter will conclude.
be spent.
• In the same meeting, a representative of a community developer based in the
low-income Frogtown area speaks up to argue in favor of spending more
housing funds in concentrated neighborhoods.
• In an October 26, 2016 meeting, the lobbyist speaks about the importance of
focusing on gentrification and displacement.
• In a December 7, 2016 meeting, the lobbyist and the representative for the
Minneapolis community development department, push back against the
inclusion of research on segregation in a draft Analysis of Impediments.
• In a February 8, 2016 meeting, the lobbyist speaks up multiple times to insist
that gentrification and displacement receive their own coverage in the final
Analysis of Impediments.
• Finally, in the March 15, 2016 meeting, which served as the capstone
discussion on the second draft Analysis of Impediments, the representative
for the Minneapolis community development department talks about the
need to focus development in highly concentrated areas where residents are
cost-burdened.
• In the same meeting, the ACER representative said that she would like more
emphasis on gentrification and displacement.
• In the same meeting, the lobbyist says that his comments have tried to move
the group away from “segregation as the problem, and more so as the
symptom.” He expresses his concern about language that suggests the
solution is to “move renters around, that is not getting to the root of the
problem.” The minutes note he “pushed back against the term desegregation
plan, noting it sounds like a displacement plan.”
440. See MOSAIC CMTY. PLAN., FAIR HOUS. IMPLEMENTATION COUNCIL,
ADDENDUM TO THE TWIN CITIES REGIONAL ANALYSIS OF IMPEDIMENTS (2017).
441. See, e.g., Eric Roper, Federal Rule on Housing Integration Never Got Off the
Ground, STAR TRIB. (Oct. 3, 2020), https://www.startribune.com/federal-rule-onhousing-integration-never-got-off-the-ground/572627311/ [https://perma.cc/XW2YWUX6].
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Conclusion
In much of the academic world, a consensus exists around the
positive benefits of integration, akin to the consensus around the
causes and harms of climate change. Despite this, neosegregationist views have spent decades accumulating support in
the ranks of Minnesota institutions. This includes organizations
with a direct interest in maintaining the segregated status quo, like
affordable housing developers and charters schools. But it has also
meant the collection of organizations that support, fund, and
promote those entities. Minnesota’s largest philanthropies have
flirted with neo-segregationism, absorbing figures from the
government and nonprofit world who promote these ideas. For
example, Lee Sheehy, the Deputy Attorney General who oversaw
the gutting of the Minnesota school desegregation rule in 2019 and
then served as the Met Council Regional Administrator, migrated
to a position as the McKnight Foundation’s Director of Regions and
Communities, where he spent over a decade heavily funding
community developers.442 Sheehy even briefly served as interim
president of the McKnight Foundation.443
Neo-segregationism’s greatest political asset is how it depicts
the status quo as desirable and change as reckless. This bias
towards the status quo ensures that proponents of neosegregationist policy can draw support from monied interests for
whom major reform would be financially and politically disruptive.
It also ensures that neo-segregationism can find easy support from
political moderates of both parties.444 Charter schools, for instance,
were developed with the support of both center-leaning businessaffiliated Republicans, and center-leaning, business-oriented
Democrats.445 Often, the campaign to promote charters, and defend
the segregation they create, has become inextricably tangled with
anti-union efforts from business interests.446
442. The Regions and Communities program allocated $700,000 to the
integration-skeptical Center for Urban and Regional Affairs, a project of the
University of Minnesota Foundation, to conduct “strategic collaboration” with other
community programs as recently as 2016. Grant Search, MCKNIGHT FOUND.,
https://www.mcknight.org/grants/search-our-grants/
[https://perma.cc/7SXQEDUC].
443. McKnight Accelerates Economic Mobility in First Slate of Vibrant & Equitable
Communities
Grants,
MCKNIGHT
FOUND.
(Mar.
2021),
https://www.mcknight.org/news-ideas/mcknight-accelerates-economic-mobility-infirst-slate-of-vibrant-equitable-communities-grants/ [https://perma.cc/VV4G-D2G3].
444. See JUNGE, supra note 118.
445. Cohen, supra note 114 (“Although conservatives led the way in for pushing
education reform in the 1980s, centrist liberals jumped on board in the early 1990s.”).
446. Id. (“Most charters are more segregated than traditional public schools, are
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While the core strength of neo-segregation comes from how it
protects the financial self-interest of the powerful, it has also made
headway in academia. There is a cottage industry of think tanks
and research organizations dedicated to supporting and assisting
the housing industry and private education reformers, often
directly funded by these industries.447 These institutions reliably
produce research and analysis that conform neatly to the policy
objectives of their benefactors—highlighting the benefits of
affordable housing, lauding school choice as instrumental to closing
achievement gaps, and attacking alternative interpretations of the
evidence.448
By design or otherwise, these institutions find themselves
frequently in conflict with civil rights organizations, because a focus
on segregation and racial isolation inevitably undercuts the
assertion that technocratic, well-funded policy tinkering can
eliminate racial disparities that have been growing since the
1990s.449
This conflict threatens to damage hard-fought civil rights
victories, especially in the legal realm. In order to protect funding
streams and the status quo, neo-segregationists today have adopted
legal arguments first advanced by right-wing groups like the Pacific
Legal Foundation. They have actively sought to limit Brown v.
Board of Education and its progeny, to obstruct the ability of cities
and schools to voluntarily integrate, and to undermine core
elements of the Fair Housing Act—most especially, its integration
imperative.450
In Minnesota these efforts are especially galling. Minnesota is
the birthplace of a remarkable amount of American civil rights
thinking—a history that should be celebrated. With the support of
these allies, neo-segregationists are instead erasing and rewriting
this history, contributing to greater racial inequality. As the civil
rights era fades from living memory, it would be a travesty to allow
non-union, and when charter educators do mount union campaigns, they almost
always face tremendous opposition.”).
447. See, e.g., id. (describing the Democratic Leadership Council’s Progressive
Policy Institute); Who We Are, supra note 405, at 28.
448. See Goetz, supra note 414.
449. MINN. EMP’T AND ECON. DEV., DEED LAB. MKT. INFO. OFF., MINNESOTA
DISPARITIES BY RACE REPORT (2020); see generally Greg Rosalsky, Minneapolis
Ranks Near Bottom for Racial Equality, NPR NEWS: PLANET MONEY (June 2, 2020),
https://www.npr.org/sections/money/2020/06/02/867195676/minneapolis-ranksnear-the-bottom-for-racial-equality
[https://perma.cc/DP47-F47D]
(expositing
Minnesota’s vast employment and wealth gap for White and Black residents).
450. See, e.g., 1998 SONAR, supra note 96, at B1 (downplaying the importance of
Brown deliberately).
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segregation to prevail once again. Those who would have the United
States divided should not be permitted to accomplish through policy
subterfuge what they could not accomplish through open revolt or
massive resistance. Minnesota should reclaim its civil rights
heritage, reject segregation once and for all, and resume the march
towards greater equality and integration.

